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ABSTRACT

This booklet reports the major themes of the National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders in Higher Education held in Washington, D.C. in May 1972. Part I examines the current U.S. policy in the Middle East and East Asia; American policy toward the "developing world" through its technical assistance efforts; and an analysis of three major international problems: economic relations, the environment, and the drug trade. Part II describes the relationship between America's participation in global affairs and American higher education. The volume concludes with a review of resources available to educators from the Bureau of Public Affairs in the Department of State. (Author/JB)

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HIGHER EDUCATION

and the WORLD

Proceedings of the National Foreign Policy Conference for
Leaders in Higher Education
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May, 1972

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
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EDUCATION

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FOREWORD

The National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders in Higher Education was co-sponsored by the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education and the American Association of Community and Junior Colleges in cooperation with the Department of State. It was designed primarily for leaders in both teacher education and community and junior colleges, whose task it is to educate the citizenry regarding the nature of our world and to explore the values and objectives that help to shape America's domestic and foreign policies. The need to know and the ability to discern the significance of events that shape our lives and to judge wisely lie at the heart of education and human progress. During this latter quarter of the twentieth century it is particularly important for the nation's educators to have the opportunity to be informed of the rationale and direction of our foreign policy.

This volume reports the major themes of the conference held in Washington, D.C., in May, 1972. Part I examines the current U.S. policy in the Middle East and East Asia; American policy toward the "developing world" through its technical assistance efforts; and an analysis of three major international problems: economic relations, the environment and the drug trade. Finally, there is a thought-provoking article on nation building. Part II describes the relationship between America's participation in global affairs and American higher education. The volume concludes with a review of resources available to educators from the Bureau of Public Affairs in the Department of State.

The co-sponsors, AACTE and AACJC, extend their appreciation to the Department of State, the many specialists and representatives from the U.S. Office of Education, and the Agency for International Development. A special word of appreciation goes to the Bureau of Public Affairs under whose direction the conference arrangements were made, and to Paula O. Goddard, AACTE, for her editorial services.

GEORGE W. DENEMARK

President

American Association of Colleges for
Teacher Education

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Associate Executive Director

American Association of Community
and Junior Colleges

PREFACE

We are most grateful to the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education and the American Association of Junior Colleges for their support and cooperation in every stage of our Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders in Higher Education. We welcome your decision to publish the conference proceedings as a further contribution to our mutual objectives in holding this conference.

The interdependent nature of the world community today increasingly requires of all Americans a knowledge and understanding of other countries and our relations with them. We in the Department of State will do whatever we can to support the academic community in its efforts to advance world affairs education in our nation's schools and colleges and to develop resources for international study and research.

At the same time we welcome the fresh resources of ideas and information which the educators offer us, and look forward to continuing close cooperation and contact between us.

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

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PART I

THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD

MIDDLE EAST ASSESSMENT

Joseph J. Sisco*

Let me say a word about the situation in Egypt today. First, there is no doubt that the sense of frustration, not only in Egypt but in other parts of the Middle East, is very deep over the lack of progress towards an overall settlement. On the other hand, there is a realistic appreciation that the exercise of the military option is not in the interest either of the Arabs or the Israelis, and carries with it, of course, very serious risks of possible major power involvement.

When we talk about the Middle East question, we are really talking about a complexity of issues. It is not only the fundamental Arab-Israeli dispute, which reflects continuing deep suspicion and deep mistrust, but serious differences of an intra-Arab character where unity continues to be illusory. Insofar as the Arabs alone are concerned, a principal characteristic is disunity and division, whether one is talking about differences between the established Arab states or differences between the various parts of the Fedayeen or Palestinian movement. And as if this were not complicated enough, there is the obvious conflict of interest between the major powers over an area which each considers important politically, economically and strategically. And it is for this reason that we view the Middle East as perhaps the most dangerous trouble spot in the world today.

Much has been said in recent days regarding a plan that was put forward by King Hussein about three or four weeks ago. In short, this plan calls for the establishment of an autonomous Palestinian entity in the West Bank, with some kind of a link to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in the East. The purpose of the plan which was addressed in the first instance to Arab audiences, was largely to tell the Palestinians in a very concrete way what King Hussein meant when he said over a year ago that once and if an overall political settlement is achieved, the Palestinians will be given an opportunity for the exercise of self-determination. In other words, this plan of King Hussein's spelled out in concrete form the kind of an overall settlement that he envisages, regarding the Jordanian-Israeli aspect of the settlement. The plan, in and of itself, does not close the very wide gap between Israel and Jordan over what should be the final border, as defined in the formal peace agreement. Now if the area today is characterized, as it is, by an uneasy calm, and if in fact one must not expect any meaningful progress in the diplomatic sphere, at least between now and the summit later in the month, what are the prospects that this uneasy ceasefire which has been maintained for nearly 22 months, can in fact be continued in the area?

The United States and the Soviet Union share parallel interests, at least in the short run, in helping to maintain the minimal conditions conducive to a ceasefire. It is not in the interest of either side for there to be either a general renewal of Arab-Israeli hostilities, or a more limited renewal of the so-called war of attrition, because both carry with them the risk of a serious conflict of interest between the two major powers in the area. It ought to be possible to find common ground between ourselves and the Soviet Union on this very, very limited short-run objective, namely, the maintenance of the ceasefire in the area. But it does not follow that the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly as manifested in Soviet policy over the last four and a half years, are one and the same. For the Soviets have been able to exploit the instability of the no-war, no-peace situation that has existed since the June war of 1967. We are up against a Soviet political strategy, bulwarked by increasing military strength in this area.

This is an area which both we and the Soviet Union consider to be of extreme importance. From the point of view of the United States, there is only one real answer: a stable Middle East based on a peace agreement in which each side has undertaken specific obligations in relation to one another. Instability and disunity are not working in favor of our own interests in the area. So, our short run objective, I think, over the coming weeks and the coming months, will be to do what we can to maintain the ceasefire. And with respect to a more permanent settlement, we believe the differences of view between the Arabs and the Israelis, on an overall settlement are so great today

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that it is unlikely that any substantial progress can be made towards such an overall settlement in the near future.

What may prove more feasible over the next year is the achievement of some common understanding between the Arabs and the Israelis on some partial agreement, a small, practical step which in fact will be a practical test of peace on the ground. And here I refer to the possibilities of an interim Suez Canal agreement, which would involve not only the opening of the Suez Canal, but also, some Israeli withdrawal east of the canal.

Our problem has been and is that we are having difficulty getting the principal participants to the conference table, albeit indirectly, under the aegis of the United States. But I think as the year develops there will be increasing pressure for the exercise of some meaningful diplomatic option by the principal parties in the area. I say this because one of the principal results of the cease-fire in the Middle East is, regardless of the strident rhetoric emanating from the area that one reads in our daily newspapers, that each side in its own way is looking for ways and means to avoid a renewal of Arab-Israeli hostilities.

So, in the short run, we will continue to work for keeping the cease-fire in place, and, secondly, our role has to be to try to facilitate and promote either a partial or an overall settlement between the two sides. In order to play this kind of a role, a constructive catalyst, our approach has to be to try to meet the legitimate conditions of both sides. Obviously, the United States enjoys a special relationship with Israel, but there is no dichotomy between the special relationship that exists in support of Israel and our support for the political independence and territorial integrity of all of the states in the area, and our role of trying to promote and to facilitate some kind of an agreement which meets the legitimate concerns of both sides. The interests of the United States in the area go beyond any one state in the area, and the primary interest is to continue to try to maintain and to reinforce if you will, the kind of conditions which will, in fact, make it more difficult and give less reason for another renewal of Arab-Israeli hostilities.

QUESTION: Do you think that the Israelis have always been as flexible as they might have been, for example, the Sadat proposal of a little more than a year ago, which was rejected by the Israelis. Was that a genuine proposal, and might it have worked?

SISCO: Neither side has been as flexible as we would have desired. As one looks over the history of the Middle East over the last 20 years, I think candidly you have to say that, in many respects, it is a history of lost opportunities. Now, I am not convinced that the notion of an interim Suez Canal agreement has reached the stage of a lost opportunity, and here I address myself to the second part of your question. In early February of last year, President Sadat announced a willingness to engage in discussion, looking toward the opening of the canal and some Israeli withdrawal. A few days later, the Prime Minister of Israel responded and indicated similar interest, and both indicated a willingness to have the United States play a middleman role in this particular instance. Well, what's the record to date, in this respect? The door still remains open regardless of all the difficulties that exist today, and regardless of the difficult rhetoric that emanates from the area.

We explored rather fully, for about four or five months, the details of such a partial settlement, and we found that some common ground existed. There was no doubt that any interim Suez Canal agreement would obviously involve the opening of the Canal. Secondly, Israel has never questioned Egyptian sovereignty over the Suez Canal. There is no doubt that there was some understanding that such an agreement would involve some Israeli withdrawal, although the Israeli government has never taken a decision as to the number of kilometers that it would withdraw from the Suez Canal. There was, I think, common ground on the idea that any such interim Suez Canal agreement must include a commitment to continue the cease-fire. There wasn't common ground as to how long the cease-fire should be extended, but certainly, both sides agreed that an extension of the cease-fire would be part and parcel of such an agreement.

Moreover, it was recognized that some practical supervisory arrangement would have to be worked out. My judgement is that most of the elements in any interim Suez Canal agreement are still negotiable today. I think the principal difficulty really is two-fold. First, both sides hold very, very strong views about the question of what sort of a presence there should be east of the Suez Canal, on the assumption that Israel would withdraw X number of kilometers from the Canal. I think there is a sharp difference of views on this particular point, but there is a much more fundamental difference which is

the real difficulty. The Egyptians want to make it clear that any interim Suez Canal agreement is not to be interpreted as a new final peace agreement or a new indefinite status quo. Therefore the Egyptians have sought, within the context of an interim Suez Canal agreement, a prior commitment on the part of the Israelis that they will withdraw totally from their territories. The Israelis have been unwilling to give this kind of a commitment; they have been willing to give a much more limited commitment, and this was expressed publicly by the foreign minister of Israel in his speech before the General Assembly last October. What he said in that speech was that in any interim Suez Canal agreement, Israel is willing to make a commitment explicitly that the line to which they would withdraw in such an agreement would not be the final line. He went on to say publicly in this General Assembly speech that they would also be willing to say explicitly that they would agree to such further lines that might be worked out by means of negotiation in the context of an overall settlement.

This was intended as a much more limited assurance to the Egyptians that any interim Suez Canal agreement in fact would be interim and would not constitute a final agreement. The interesting thing about this is that the fundamental difficulty, in my opinion, has been the difference of interpretation between the two sides regarding the November 1967 Security Council Resolution which laid down the basic principles of a settlement. The Arab interpretation of that resolution is that it means total Israeli withdrawal to the lines that existed before the June war. The Israeli interpretation is that it does embrace the principle of withdrawal of Israeli forces, but that any final line must be the subject of agreement between the two sides, brought about by negotiations between the two sides. In other words, the Security Council resolution neither endorsed the line that existed on June 5, 1967, as the final line, nor did it preclude it as the final line. It is this territorial question related to practical, on-the-ground security arrangements that has been the fundamental difficulty between Egypt and Israel in the first instance. It has plagued Ambassador Jarring's efforts to achieve an overall settlement and it has plagued the efforts of the United States to try to achieve an interim Suez Canal agreement.

QUESTION: Mr. Sisco, it seems to me there is a more fundamental question. Israel cannot possibly agree to anything which negates her national survival. If Israel cannot give up her national survival, and if the Egyptians will not recognize it or agree to it, how can there be any kind of a solution? It seems to me that is the more fundamental one. Is there any sign of some kind of a "give" on that?

SISCO: On this, I would say to you, and I think the Israelis would agree with this view, there has been progress in the Arab world in relationship to the acceptance of the reality of Israel. Of course, there are still statements from time to time that amount to saying that the objective continues to be to drive the Israelis into the sea. I don't think this is the preponderant view of most of the Arab leadership in the Middle East, and one of the results, I think, of the cease-fire, has been to create a better atmosphere of live and let live. Do not misunderstand. We're still far away from a total acceptance, and no one is under any illusion that real coexistence can come about in any short run. This can only come about if you are able to create a situation where in fact there are open borders, where there's real intercourse between the two sides.

One of the positive elements in the area over the last two to two-and-a-half years is that, regardless of these differences, nobody has really turned his back on the notion of a political solution, based on the November, 1967 resolution. When I say nobody, I mean the two principal combatants on the Arab side namely Egypt and Jordan, and Israel on its own.

Of course, no one is talking about either side giving up the conditions of their own survival. When I say in rather euphemistic State "Departmentese" that the objective of the exercise has to be to promote an agreement that meets the legitimate concerns of both sides, I'm talking about a situation which is radically different than the situation that has existed in the area over the last 20 years. In the last 20 years, you've had *de facto* armistice arrangements in which the lines have not been defined and in which neither side is committed in any kind of an obligation in relationship to the other. We are trying to substitute a real peace agreement for this kind of uneasy armistice arrangement that has given rise to three wars.

So in this modern era, there can be no absolute security. Territory is one aspect of security, but a commitment to peace in the formal sense is also another aspect of security, and so that is what we are trying to arrange, or to facilitate, because in the real sense, we're in no position to impose it, and neither can we become either a substitute

for the parties or a substitute for agreement. What we're trying to facilitate is the kind of understanding whereby each side makes commitments to the other on the basis of this kind of coexistence, and I think that, regardless of the difficulties, the conditions, generally speaking, are a little bit better today than, say, two or three years ago.

QUESTION: Coming in to Istanbul on the plane, I noticed some time ago some very, very large Soviet naval vessels, and I was wondering if you care to comment on the Russian naval activities in the Mediterranean?

SISCO: Yes. Well, first let us look at the situation in strategic terms. If you were Mr. Brezhnev and looking at this from, say, the Moscow balcony, obviously you have today a very substantial Soviet naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. They have real capacity in the Persian Gulf, and they have a substantial naval capacity in the Indian Ocean. I said also that the no-war/no-peace situation is not in our interest. To put it very bluntly, the Russians have been able to exploit the Arab-Israeli dispute as an instrument of the policy of penetration in the Middle East.

When you look at the base that the Soviet Union has in Egypt, certainly their presence bulwarks Egypt vis-a-vis Israel. But that's not the primary purpose. You have got to look at the Soviet base in Egypt as primarily a base which is in the first instance usable to the Soviet Union, vis-a-vis the whole position of the United States in the Mediterranean and more broadly speaking, the position of NATO in the Mediterranean, or as normally referred to, the "underbelly of NATO." So that you have here a policy on the part of the Soviet Union, not only of a presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, but seeking ways and means to extend their influence in the Western Mediterranean.

What have you had, for example, in recent weeks or months? You have a treaty of understanding between the Soviet Union and Egypt. You have a treaty of understanding between the Soviet Union and India, emanating out of the developments in the subcontinent. Just ten days ago, you have a treaty of understanding signed by the Soviet Union, between themselves and Iraq. These are largely not new extensions; they are largely reflections of what the Soviet position has been in this area.

What is the implication, insofar as the United States is concerned? And when I said, as I did earlier, that there is no real answer for the United States except a political settlement that meets the legitimate concerns of both sides, I meant we need a continuing strong presence in these areas. If American diplomacy is going to be meaningful in these areas, it has to be a diplomacy that is backed with teeth. That is why I say that an American presence in the Mediterranean, some capacity, as limited as it is, in the Persian Gulf, some capacity in the subcontinent is important. Not because one has to view this from the point of view of matching ship for ship with the other side, but simply because this kind of a physical presence is essential as a corollary to American diplomacy in the area. This may be a very old-fashioned and traditional view that I am expressing, but unfortunately, the objectives of power realities in these areas really don't change every six weeks.

QUESTION: I noticed in the title of Marshall Green, it included responsibility for East Asian Affairs. I noticed in your title, responsibility for South Asian Affairs. I was wondering if any difficulties have risen from this probably necessary but somewhat arbitrary division of Asian affairs?

SISCO: It is absolutely arbitrary. We have never really found a satisfactory organizational pattern, and there are any number of ways in which it could be done. Secondly, there has been absolutely no difficulty. The coordination is very good, and the communication in this department is very good, but as you say, it's quite arbitrary; it could be done in any number of other ways.

QUESTION: Given the nationalistic hatreds and territorial conflicts, are there any potential tangible economic advantages for the two sides in an agreement, and what would they be?

SISCO: The potential is tremendous, just absolutely tremendous in terms of economic development. Let me review more or less on a country-by-country basis. The big job in the context of a peace settlement for Egypt would be, frankly, to rebuild its economy, almost from the bottom to the top. One of the big jobs would be the rebuilding of cities, for example, that have been more or less destroyed on their side of the Suez Canal. Secondly, the regaining of the Suez Canal itself would mean that Egypt would derive the resources from that traffic and be far less reliant on the quarterly subventions that are being paid to Egypt today by Kuwait, Libya and others. But more fundamentally, these are all developing countries. There would be possibility of greater exploitation, for example, of resources, such as oil, in Egypt as well as in other parts of the

Arab world.

The opportunities would be infinite, and we have said over the years, that in the context of an overall political settlement, we would try to be very helpful on the economic side, simply because a number of these leaders then could address themselves in a much more direct way to the real needs of the people. One of things that the new leadership in Egypt, for example, did at the outset following the death of Nasser, was to promulgate a new constitution; the Arab Socialist Union was refurbished, and there is a much freer atmosphere in Egypt today, for example, than that which existed, say, 18 months ago. The role of women is being enhanced. There is a special attempt being made to increase the role of youth, for Egypt is not immune to the same sort of developments that are occurring worldwide.

Now, you move on to other parts of the Arab world—Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria—there is infinite opportunity here to try to assist these developing countries, and this I think would make a major contribution to stability in the area. One of the difficulties, of course, and one of the psychological blocks in this whole peace effort, is that you have a small country, such as Israel with 2½ million people who quite frankly have mastered western technology. They are operating in the twentieth century in every sense of the word, whereas I think our Arab friends are having difficulty. Obviously they have not developed the same sort of technical and industrial know-how, and this would, in and of itself, be a tremendous opportunity for countries all over the world, as well as the international community to make a contribution to the development of the Arab countries. Whereas there are 2½ million people in Israel, there are 100 million people in the Arab world, soon to become 200 million if you really project the situation over the next few decades.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, to borrow a Biblical phrase from Mt. Carmel and the Prophet Elijah, there is a cloud a little bigger than the size of a man's hand, and that is the question of the squeeze by the Arab countries on our oil supply, Japan's oil supply, and others. The problem of Israel and the Arabs may be bypassed by a nationalistic confrontation between the United States and the USSR that may make the Arab/Israeli conflict look like a Sunday school picnic. Can you say something about that?

SISCO: I think that is a very cogent observation. If you look at it from the point of view of the interests of the United States, notice the number of reports that are really talking about the problems of resources, energy, ecology, and what-have-you. If you look ahead at our projected needs for oil to the year 2,000, they are very, very substantial, and most technical experts say that even if you were to exploit known reserves and develop others that are in the western hemisphere, in Alaska, Canada, Venezuela, Latin America, in our own country, and so on, that there is likely to be a shortage.

As we know, Europe relies on Middle Eastern oil to the tune of roughly between 55 to 60 per cent, depending on which country you're talking about. In Japan, 85 per cent of all oil comes from the Middle East. One of the objectives, I have always felt, of the Soviets, is to deny access. It is not that the Soviets themselves necessarily need all of this oil, although they're going to be confronted with problems in the long run, as we are.

But just imagine the strategic implication should the Soviets be in a position to deny this oil to our western European allies. I mean, it really is a dagger at the throat. That is one thing that's worrisome, and that is why we keep hammering away and keep continuing in these efforts, as discouraging as they may be, to try to achieve some stability and some understanding in this area. Is it in our interest to increase our reliance on Middle Eastern oil, in an area which is so unstable, as it is? My own judgment is, it's not, quite frankly. We must exploit, in my judgment, as many of the resources as we can in our own hemisphere, and that to the extent to which we have to increase our reliance on oil coming from the Middle East, it is obviously a complicating feature, insofar as what is going to happen in the area. I think one of the dangers is that the United States cannot afford to become hostage to this particular oil for its own security, largely because it is so unpredictable and unstable.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, will a temporary reopening of the Suez Canal increase Russian naval might in the Indian Ocean?

SISCO: If I were to answer your question in a narrow, strategic sense, I think you could make the argument that, given the proximity of the Soviet Union, as against our distances, that access to the Suez Canal in a narrow sense might be slightly more advantageous to the Soviet Union than to the United States. But I do not think you can view it in this rather more narrow framework. I think there are two other considerations that are relevant. If one could achieve an agreement between Egypt and Israel on such an

opening and such a partial settlement, the political implication of this in the area, broadly speaking, would be so important that it could lead, in time, to a radical transformation of the political climate in this area. I have always believed, for example, that one of the results of such an agreement would be the resumption of relations between the United States and a number of Arab countries. Secondly, I think the whole political climate would change, and the Soviet presence would be operating in a different political climate than that which exists today. It would be a climate where, hopefully, people would begin to direct their attention towards peaceful pursuits, and where the notion of physical military presence would take on a little different connotation than where there is always the possibility of an incident occurring the very next day.

I don't think the Soviet military presence would be any more immune than our military presences have been all over the world over the last 10 or 15 years. What has been the pattern? Whenever the threat has diminished, the rationale, justification and the need, if you will, for an American military presence, has been reduced, and so there has been a progressive reduction of American commitments over the past number of years, in a number of these places, such as Korea, and so on.

So any such agreement would have not only this fundamental impact on the parties in the area, and give hope that you would get this live-and-let-live coexistence that we talked about, but in my judgment, it would also have strategic implications as it relates to the positions of the major powers. Not that the Russians would pack up and go home tomorrow from Egypt, but obviously the conditions would be different, and they would be conditions in my judgment that are much more favorable to the West than to the East.

QUESTION: It seems to me that U Thant fumbled the ball in 1967. Is there a chance that President Nixon might send Henry Kissinger up secretly to talk to Waldheim?

SISCO: I am not really up on the secret goings-on of Henry Kissinger in this regard, but let me address your question, because it's a serious question. Waldheim, as the new Secretary General, I think has embarked on a much more activist sort of leadership than his predecessor. I think Waldheim believes in the old Hammarskjoldian concept of the UN, that under Article 99, the Secretary General has very broad responsibilities, and that on behalf of the world community, on behalf of the international organization, he is trying to take steps here and there.

The UN has had more of a role in the Middle East than any other area in the world, if you look over the situation in the last 20 or 22 years. Jarring is still quite active; no doors have been closed there. Waldheim himself has tried to manifest a little more direct interest. They are up against the same kinds of problems that we are, and others. The real difficulty as far as the UN is concerned is this: one side has never felt that it has gotten a fair shake, and I would say to you that this view has some credence and validity. One, the Security Council, Israel feels, is loaded against it. Secondly, they have never been entirely satisfied with the kind of role that the United Nations played on the ground, and what is fresh in the memory—and here I'm not trying to justify one policy as against another—but what one must say quite frankly is that what is fresh in the memory of the Israelis is the specter of the *casus belli* just before the June War of 1967. Nasser announced the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba, but secondly, he forced what I consider to be the precipitous move of the UN out of the Sinai, and of course, that obviously complicated the picture of great deal.

It is a question of what practical security arrangements on the ground will give assurances to both sides. We are not talking here about a paper peace; we are talking about something that is real. One would hope that the UN will have some continuing role, but my own judgment is that in order for practical security arrangements to be developed, I think myself that, as a minimum, you are going to have to try to maximize the actual participation of the parties themselves in any security arrangements on the ground.

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

MARSHALL GREEN*

The Far East is the scene of great transition. The distinguishing characteristics of this evolving East Asia, it seems to me, are that we have uniquely difficult problems. First of all, we have China with a vast land mass and two-thirds of the population of East Asia with which we have no diplomatic relations and with which we have been at sword's points until recently. China has this great preponderant weight that hangs over Southeast Asia like a sword of Damocles that creates psychological attitudes and problems in Southeast Asia.

Four of the five divided countries in the world are in East Asia, and as you know, divided countries are areas of particular tension and danger, witness Germany. But in Asia we have Korea, Laos, and Viet Nam, and of course, China in a way is a divided country. We have fought a war over Korea; we are now fighting wars over the divided countries of Viet Nam and Laos. All the divided countries of East Asia, if you include Mainland China, are geographically connected, and they are more or less motivated by a basic Maoist philosophy. That is a unique problem. In many ways, you can say that it is by far the most difficult problem we have, not only in Asia, but in the world at large.

A third unique problem is that all the countries in East Asia except Japan, China and Thailand were under colonial rule until some time after World War II, which means that they have had precious little time to organize themselves as nations, and they have done it in the face of a threat from the divided countries, from the Asian communists. It is remarkable they have done as well as they have under the circumstances.

There are many other difficult problems in East Asia. I do not want to say that those are the only ones, but those are the unique ones. Of course, there are lots of other problems, like population, or I call it population, because it impinges on the whole environment problem. In Japan it is a particularly serious problem, but it is a growing problem in all the industrialized areas of Asia. There are also the problems of corruption and social dislocation.

But there are encouraging features on the landscape, too, and I do not want to parade a whole series of problems. I think that one of the most encouraging things is the progress, the enormous success story of Japan, and Japan's ability now to assist the other developing countries of East Asia. Korea has had one of the fastest growing economies in the world—17 percent, two years ago, to give you an idea. And of course, Taiwan and Hong Kong and Singapore show you what the Chinese people, with their remarkable business acumen, can achieve in a free setting, in contrast to the comparative stagnation on mainland China.

Australia and New Zealand, although we do not usually talk about them as being in East Asia, are part of my area. They now look north and are participating in the activities and helping out the problems of the north, whereas a generation ago, they were European-oriented. They are Pacific powers, and are now behaving as such.

And of course, my old bailiwick of Indonesia, which makes up one-half the population of Southeast Asia as well as representing about one-half the area of Southeast Asia, has undergone an extraordinary switch in the last six or seven years. When I arrived there as Ambassador in the summer of 1965, there was virtually a communist state, and Sukarno was the world's bad boy. They were at war with Malaysia and with Singapore and with the British. Today, an enormous change has taken place; Sukarno has been replaced by a man who really does care for the people and works for them—Suharto. Indonesia has good relations with all its neighbors. The runaway inflation of 750 per cent per year that greeted me upon my arrival is down to seven per cent per year, which is a good rate by developing countries' standards.

I say this because we have been looking so intently at Viet Nam and it has been a bitter and frustrating experience. But let us not forget, there are other stories, too. When I arrived in Jakarta, the streets were festooned with signs saying, "Green, go home," but under one of those signs somebody had written with lipstick saying, "and take me with you." And so I always had well-placed faith.

There are many other factors, good and bad. We are living in a multipolar world. The Sino-Soviet rift, of course, is now well known to everybody. The situation has

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changed a great deal in that respect, and it has opened up whole new vistas. It is a time for an active, innovative diplomacy.

And then there is U.S. public sentiment. We have felt, I think understandably, that we have taken on a disproportionate share of the burdens of this world, and it is time that others should do more, that other countries should maximize their self-efforts, and that other countries outside the area, the rich countries of western Europe and Japan, should be doing a lot more to help in this part of the world.

It seems to me the changes that I have described, good, bad, or indifferent, motivate the policies that this administration is now pursuing in our part of the world. Of course, policies really never change, any more than national objectives change. What I am talking about are more modifications of policies, and it seems to me that in East Asia, they have been three-fold.

First has been the Nixon Doctrine of shared responsibility that says we will help other countries maintain their security, but that they must do the maximum to help themselves. We will give more under our assistance program so that they can achieve that capability of self defense. We will provide the nuclear umbrella but as far as the kinds of wars that we see now in East Asia, those should be their responsibility to the maximum extent possible. That, of course, is the concept underlying Vietnamization.

Under the Nixon Doctrine, we have reduced our forces in Vietnam by about 480,000, but we have also decreased our force strength in other parts of East Asia. We took an American division out of Korea, which means a net reduction of 20,000 men, and which saved the American taxpayer \$350,000,000 a year net. We have taken 12,000 men out of Japan and Okinawa, 9,000 from the Philippines, 16,000 from Thailand, as well as the almost half million men from Viet Nam.

Accordingly, the cost of these undertakings has come down enormously. Twenty-eight billion dollars a year is what the war was costing us in East Asia. The current cost is still far too high, around six or seven billion dollars a year, but nevertheless the costs have come down, and of course, the casualties have, too.

That is the Nixon Doctrine in terms of numbers. But numbers alone miss the real point. It seems to me what we are really trying to do is to prevent the pendulum of over-involvement from swinging to a point of under-involvement, a feature that has characterized American foreign policy in the past, as we have learned to our grief. "We will do our share, but they must do more," is the Nixon Doctrine, and history will judge its success or failure, it seems to me, on the grounds of whether or not it will prevent this pendulum from swinging from what has been excessive involvement to one of dangerous underinvolvement, which I would call stark isolation.

Let's bring it into the middle where it can be held over a period of time where our purposes are constant and the people know it; then they can plan and act accordingly. It will give wider scope to regional cooperation and to maximizing their self-efforts. This is the concept of the Nixon Doctrine. I feel deeply about it; I feel it is the key to the proper role and stance, not only in East Asia, but in the world at large.

Now, our second major policy change, it seems to me, has been our relationship with Japan. We have had a good relationship with Japan; we occupied the country, of course, as the result of a war, so the background may not be exactly pleasant, but we reached a stage in late November, 1969, where President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato signed a communique that became a kind of charter for our relationship. We called it partnership, although the word in Japanese is *patanashipu*, which shows it is not a native term; they borrowed it from us.

But this highly advertised, close relationship between us and Japan did require that both Japan and the United States move faster to have a better dialogue with People's Republic of China, lest our highly-advertised partnership be seen by Peking as being a threat against it. And so we had to move faster in our diplomacy to have closer dialogue with Peking, and Japan had to do the same thing and is doing so. But when we did that, we also had to show Moscow that our efforts to have a better dialogue with Peking were not aimed at Moscow. We thus ended up by having an effort to have a better relationship with all. I do not suggest that this was the result of some carefully drafted plan. It was largely adventitious, as the best things in policy are.

Our relationship with Japan is the cornerstone of peace in the Pacific, as President Nixon said. We are not going to pursue a better relationship with China at the expense of our fundamental relationship with Japan. Our relationship with Japan is important not only because of all the trade and other connections that we have and the security connections that we have with Japan, but also because Japan can do so much, and will, I

am sure, to help developing countries. This help will not be in the form of military assistance, but in the form of giving more economic aid on highly concessional terms. If Japan can do that, of course, it will meld very neatly with the Nixon Doctrine of shared responsibility.

There has also been, of course, a third policy shift that has characterized foreign policy in the Nixon administration—our rapprochement with the People's Republic of China. President Nixon had said back in October, 1967, that we have to deal with the reality of China, and we have undertaken a whole series of unilateral moves to lift restrictions on trade and travel to the People's Republic of China. Moves did not require any kind of reciprocal action from China or the approval of our Congress. These were moves that I might say American scholars, many of you, probably, and many of us Foreign Service professionals, in one degree or another, had long recommended. These steps were finally taken.

China, I think, appreciates that we do not now and have not for the last several years, even in the preceding administration, sought to isolate and contain mainland China. In our conversations in Peking, this point came through very loud and clear. They did not feel that we were containing and isolating them. I think that they felt that we did in fact have goodwill, that American people like Chinese people, and vice versa, that we do have a good relationship over the years. These things were understood. And it was on that basis, as well as on the basis of the Nixon Doctrine under which we have removed 540,000 men from East Asia, that if there was any fear in a paranoiac Peking that we were trying to hedge them in, that surely was proof enough that we were not seeking to do so. This problem has thus been eliminated.

I am not suggesting that our motives in having a better relationship with Peking are the same as Peking's motives in having a better relationship with us, and in all my talks with the East Asian leaders, I cautioned them against trying to describe what Peking's motivations were. Let's just judge them by the results. I have a strong suspicion they are not the same as ours, and I am not suggesting that they are necessarily friendly towards us. Our motivations are very clear: it is impermissible not to have a relationship amongst one billion people, one-third of the people on this planet, which has been the case, now, for over two decades. Somebody had to reach across this vast chasm of tension and misunderstanding and opposing ideologies to see if there could not be a better relationship between our two countries. There was only one man in the world that could do that, and that was the President of the United States.

What did we achieve in Peking? Well, it seems to me, we achieved a great deal of a rather enduring quality. This is not just window dressing, not just a lot of pap. I think the fact of the matter is that they have rather strong reasons for wanting to have good relationships with us. The conception of our knocking on the door rather insistently in a petitioning way to Peking, which finally opens the door disdainfully to the United States is completely wrong. Our relationship is based upon the principle of mutuality, which I might say is a favorite word in the People's Republic Chinese vocabulary.

Our reasons for wanting to open up a relationship with China were based not only on the fact that we wanted to remove tension and dangers but also because we recognize that China at long last was moving in the right direction. What we did this year would not have been possible two or three years ago, certainly not during the height of the Cultural Revolution. But now that Peking is moving in this desired direction, now is the fleeting moment when the opportunity had to be seized.

As a result of our trip to Peking, we have an extraordinary situation where, without abandoning our friends on Taiwan, while maintaining our diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan, while maintaining our military commitments to the Republic of China, while still continuing to promote investment and trade with Taiwan, we nevertheless have the prospect of really improving our relationship with the People's Republic of China. Now, who would have thought that was possible, six months or a year ago? I did not.

We now have a channel in Paris between our two embassies, our two ambassadors and their staffs, to have as the President said, sober discussions. We also have an occasional emissary who visits Peking and can see the top leadership there, which is not always the case with other ambassadors who are stationed in Peking. We now have direct trade with China. We have the prospect of exchanges with China that might be better than exchanges it has with any other country. We have started to have a communication, a dialogue with them, and I think the most important thing about a dialogue is the

perception that one gains about the other fellow. I think we are learning a bit about how each other's minds work.

Now, of course, the leaders of China are revolutionaries. Their whole life has been one of commitment to struggle — the Yunnan caves, before that the Long March; they fought against the Chinese Nationalists and the Japanese, and of course they fought against the United Nations in Korea. They believe in struggle as a way of life. Their goal is not peace; their goal is justice, as they would define it. Justice is never attained, therefore the struggle goes on. In the Shanghai Communique they started out by saying that the people demand revolution, and nations demand liberation. This is their philosophy. They are revolutionaries, and they want to be seen as revolutionaries, and they must maintain their competitive position in the communist world by being revolutionaries.

On the other hand, they are also Chinese, so they are concerned with the power of China. They are concerned with the safety and security of China and the progress and development of China. These things often clash, and where they clash, I predict that the revolution will give way to the national interests of China. It is on that basic concept that I feel many things can happen. They are trying to develop a better image before the world. They want to be the leader of the developing world, for good or for evil. They, of course, have good credentials to be the leaders of the developing world. They are already the largest nation in the world. They are a developing nation; they are the only developing nation that is a nuclear nation. In order to build up their image, they are beginning to do some things the right way — like returning the Philippine hijacked plane, stray U.S. yachts, etc.

There is one other dimension to this problem of China, and that is that I do think it can precipitate a kind of an escalatory process towards peace. It would be very hard for me to document this or to prove it, but if you look through the news the last few weeks and see items like this, and you wonder how they may relate to the improved US-PRC relationship — Gromyko visited Japan in January and an agreement was reached to open peace treaty negotiations between Japan and the Soviet Union. While Gromyko was in Japan, Chinese propaganda against Japan suddenly eased a bit. China has indulged in less rhetoric about the inevitability of a remilitarized Japan. We do not think Japan is going to be remilitarized, but the Chinese evidently do, and they say so in the Shanghai communique.

The Red Cross talks between North Korea and South Korea are moving ahead. A year or so ago we would never have thought it possible to have North and South Korea talking with each other. Very recently there has been a resumption of the border talks between Peking and Moscow. And incidentally, Sino-Soviet trade this year is about three times what it was the year before that.

So you have a kind of a process and potential in this situation, where countries, in order to gain credit and better their image before the world — in a competitive world — may be included to do more things the right way. It is no longer a bipolarized world. It is a multipolarized world, and in that type of a world I think we are going to find a different interaction, and interface among powers, especially among the great powers. If you put two fighters in the ring, you know predictably how they are going to act. If you put three fighters in the ring, it becomes enormously complex, as A wants B and C to have it out, but not get involved himself. And as you put more fighters in the ring with relatively different capabilities, there is going to be a tendency to stand off and weigh very carefully the price of involvement, because involvement would be a weakening of one's position relative to the others. That would not be true in the bipolarized world. There is a cushion of time that seems to me to discourage, and to some extent, obviate impulsive, adventuristic action.

In the vista ahead of us, it seems to me there are many, many possibilities, and countries should not consider that their friendship is finite. If we have a better relationship with China, it doesn't mean that we have less good friendship with Japan. A man's friendship is not finite; why should that be of nations? Why shouldn't a nation's capability of friendship expand? Have we too long harped upon the concept of balance of power, which has all these neat plusses and minuses? I challenge that concept. I think we have a different prospect.

THE U.S. AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD

JOHN A. HANNAH*

About a year ago I had the opportunity to address another group of educators, gathered to discuss U.S. foreign policy in this same room. Since then we in the foreign assistance business and particularly those of us in A.I.D. have experienced disappointments and surprises, some successes and considerable progress.

For those concerned with America's role in helping the people of the poor or less developed countries, October 29, 1971, was a disappointing day. On that day the Senate defeated the aid authorization bill. Nobody really expected that vote. It came after a week of bitter debate over the war in Indochina. There was very little discussion of economic development, social change, or technical assistance to help peoples and governments in the less developed countries move toward lives of better quality.

In the aftermath of that action, within two or three days there developed a surprising amount of support for the idea that our country cannot drop out of the world. The Press and opinion leaders of the country became active and articulate in supporting a restoration of the program. A sample survey of editorials in 138 newspapers revealed that over 80% of the Press favored continuation of the program. They recognized that in our own best interest we cannot ignore the plight of two-thirds of the world's people suffering poverty, ignorance and disease — living miserably and dying young.

The Scripps Howard newspapers editorialized "...we don't think the American people are ready to reject a simple moral principle; that the rich are obligated, domestically and internationally, to help the poor." And the Milwaukee Journal said, "there is too much wisdom in the Senate to allow this shortsighted vote to stand." This prediction proved to be right and within a few days the Senate divided the bill into two parts and approved both of them by overwhelmingly favorable votes of more than 3 to 1, more than 60 for and 20 against.

Many educators and educational organizations joined in the chorus of protest. The National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, the American Association of University Women, American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, the American Council on Education, and many more urged Congress to reverse its decision. They were a part of a surprisingly large group including the League of Women Voters, church groups, organized labor, the national agricultural organizations and many more.

For those of us who have been trying to encourage public interest in the vital and important question of America's role with the two-thirds of the world's people living in the less developed countries the temporary defeat paid some unexpected and beneficial dividends. It provided a compelling opportunity for Congress, the Executive Branch, the media and the general public to discuss three basic problems:

First, what is the role and purpose of our U.S. foreign assistance program? What does it do or fail to do?

Second, what kind of foreign assistance program should the United States have in this decade of the Seventies?

And a third question. Does foreign assistance continue to make sense for the post-Vietnam era when the United States has serious domestic problems that obviously need attention?

The answers to these questions must start with an understanding of our present development assistance program about which there is much misinformation.

Economic aid is accused of being a "giveaway." It is not. About two-thirds of A.I.D.'s development program consists of loans. Less than one-fourth of one percent of the more than \$14 billion in loans made by A.I.D. and its predecessor agencies have ever been in default for failure to pay interest or principal payments on time.

It is often alleged that the U.S. carries a disproportionate share of the world's assistance burden. This allegation is years out of date. In the years immediately following World War II our country was alone in the aid-giving business. Today we provide about one-third of total Free World aid to the developing countries and the other 15 assisting countries provide the rest. U.S. foreign economic aid amounts to less than *one-third* of

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one percent of our gross national product. Most of the aid-giving countries contribute a substantially higher percentage of their GNP to foreign aid than we do. The United States now ranks twelfth among the 16 aid-giving countries, behind Portugal, France, the Netherlands, Australia, Japan, Canada, Belgium, West Germany, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Denmark. Russia gives more aid to Cuba than the United States provides to all of Latin America.

Many think foreign assistance is a drain on our balance of payments. It is not. The U.S. balance of payments and gold outflow problems result primarily from major defense expenditures, U.S. investments abroad and tourist spending overseas, not from foreign aid. Foreign assistance is accused of sending dollars abroad at a time when employment here is lagging. The aid program sends U.S. goods and services abroad, not dollars. About 86 percent of A.I.D.'s funds spent for all purposes remain in the United States. On commodities alone, \$972 million out of \$975 million spent in fiscal year 1971 was used to buy goods from more than 4,000 American companies in all 50 states. We had nearly 1,300 technical service contracts with 134 American universities and colleges, private research groups and other institutions. These represented \$682 million worth of development research and work.

Foreign assistance is accused of doing for others what others will not do for themselves. Again not true. The poor countries invest at least eight dollars of their own funds for every dollar that comes to them from us.

Our economic assistance deals with basic human problems in four principal areas - agriculture and food production, education, population planning and health, and public administration. We support humanitarian agencies and disaster relief. Last year we provided assistance to victims of 49 disasters in 39 countries worldwide. We provide food for school lunch and work programs both directly and through voluntary agencies such as CARE, and the Catholic, Protestant and Jewish relief programs. A.I.D. is the most significant factor in the less developed world today in drawing public attention to population problems and in encouraging development of family planning programs.

Every year we support approximately 13,000 trainees from the poor countries in education programs in this country and elsewhere. For example, in country after country in Africa the participant training program of A.I.D. has helped to identify and finance the training of technicians and administrators who are today the backbone of many African governments. In one large African country which, at independence, had only eight university graduates, A.I.D. provided training for more than 600 at the technical college and university level and returned them to the country in a ten-year period. There are more than 160,000 mature men and women now returned to the less developed countries after completing degree programs of practical training programs in this country. Many of them are now in important roles in their governments, in industry, in education, in the health field, in agriculture, etc. They represent a very valuable resource in the encouragement of development.

A.I.D. provides credit to small farmers in Colombia, fertilizer to small farmers in India, health facilities to poor people in rural areas, education for millions of students, nutrition and feeding programs for low income groups and a wide variety of help to individual citizens in the poor countries to improve their quality of life and to assure better lives for their children.

The development of human resources - of people - is both the means and the objective of national development. General social progress *cannot* be achieved by a small elite commanding a huge constituency of illiterate and disoriented people. Success in development requires that at least the majority of people be supplied with the knowledge and opportunity to participate to some reasonable degree in economic, social and political activity.

Intense efforts were made by the developing countries in the 60's to expand their educational systems and meet the demands for improvement of human skills. Expenditures of their own funds for education increased from \$1.5 billion in 1950 to roughly \$12 billion in 1970. The higher priority given to education resulted in substantial progress in meeting manpower requirements. During the period, primary school enrollments more than doubled, while secondary school and higher education enrollments, quadrupled. As a result, a nucleus of higher-level manpower required for nation building now exists in most developing countries.

During the 1960's the major focus of U.S. assistance to education was centered upon institution-building projects. Technical assistance emphasized the development of comprehensive secondary schools, elementary and secondary teacher training programs, formal vocational technical education, and university development. The main thrust of these programs was to increase the number and improve the facilities, equipment, and administrations to meet the demands of expanding school populations. National education systems were strengthened, administrators and teachers were trained, and institutions were built.

In many countries the trained leaders and established institutions constitute a base from which to focus upon the *qualitative* aspects of the education system. U.S. assistance is being used to modernize methods of curriculum evaluation and review, for introducing new concepts of mathematics and science, for integrating practical areas such as agriculture and technical training into the general education program and for developing useful instructional materials fitting the indigenous requirements.

The simple export of educational patterns from one country to another — from one cultural setting to a quite different one — can sometimes create more problems than it solves. Imported educational models often fit poorly both the pocketbook and the priorities of the receiving country. The burgeoning population growth also complicates the educational problems.

To enroll all school-age youth, the developing countries would have to double or treble their education budgets. Their systems reach too few people with the wrong kind of education and at prohibitive cost. In too many countries only a minority of the students fortunate enough to become enrolled ever advance far enough to be literate. For instance, in India and Pakistan in 1966, fewer than one-third of all pupils enrolled in the first grade ever reached the fifth grade, the last year of primary school. In Latin America fewer than one-half reached the fourth grade and in equatorial and tropical Africa, less than one-quarter of the first graders ever completed the fourth grade. Education budgets have been rising twice as fast as GNP in most LDC's, but half of all their children are still out of school because there are no schools for them, no teachers, no books. The developing countries must develop non-traditional, low-cost systems of education, if they are to roll back the tide of illiteracy. For the country with a per capita GNP of \$200 per year or less, it is futile to advocate universal education opportunities in Western type schools with 30 or fewer students per school room, teachers with graduate degrees, modern visual aids and all the rest. Their economies cannot support that kind of a school system.

To achieve useful education for more people at a bearable cost we are seeking to discover more about the potential of out-of-school learning. Emphasizing non-formal education does not necessarily mean de-emphasizing formal education. It does mean developing a new dimension of education which can provide learning experiences for a much larger proportion of the population in the environment in which they live.

Recent analyses have concluded that it is beyond the capacity of most developing countries to bring quality education at even the primary level to the majority of the population without the use of modern communications techniques. In many countries, rapid expansion of the primary school network has been accomplished by relying on teachers with only rudimentary knowledge of the official language and a minimal education. Their efforts must be supplemented with radio, television, programmed instruction and other technological devices. Prudent use of these modern methods can upgrade the level of teaching and make possible the rapid adoption of curriculum reforms. In the large areas where no schools yet exist, mass communications can provide both villagers and urban dwellers with needed skills and a kind of education that will make living for them more productive and satisfying.

A.I.D. is participating in or encouraging very promising programs involving country-wide TV education in El Salvador and the Ivory Coast. People are at the center of development. Development is meaningful only if it can be translated from impersonal statistics, and graphs, and measures, and emphasis on GNP into more and better food, education, health, and jobs for people. Above all, no matter how rugged and unrelenting life may be for this generation in the least developed countries, there must be justifiable hope that life may be better for their children.

The pace and direction of development assistance is determined by the developing countries themselves. Their problems must be solved in their countries by their people. At best external aid can only provide encouragement and help for the peoples in the assisted countries as they move in the direction of harnessing their resources to improve

the quality of life for all of their people.

This is what U.S.A.I.D. should be about. It is an attainable goal, and one which merits the support of the American people.

QUESTION: Robert McNamara, the head of the World Bank, has indicated that a developed nation should at the very least be able to afford one per cent of its GNP during a given year for foreign aid. I assume that would mean something in the neighborhood of ten billion dollars for the United States. Assuming that foreign aid is in the national interest of this country, how do you contend with the following challenges to it, as I see them: On the one hand, the frustration of the public as to being overtaxed, when we have 20 million people in our own country who do not have enough to eat. People simply feel that foreign aid dollars are not well spent. Then, add to that the Congressional antipathy. Congress has been losing control over large areas of foreign policy, and seemingly taking it out on the foreign aid aspect of our foreign policy...How do you contend with both an apathetic and antagonistic public as a whole, and the Congress in particular, in trying to arrive at the kinds of programs you think we need?

DR. HANNAH: We have problems in this country that are going to have to be solved. You mentioned hungry people. If there are hungry people in the United States, it is a failure of getting the food delivered to them. There is plenty of food. It is not because there is not enough to go around. We have civil rights problems, we have problems in the big cities; we have the environmental problems of clean air and clean water. Having spent a lifetime in education, and as the chairman indicated, twelve years as chairman of the Civil Rights Commission, and generally doing unpopular things that people did not want to be troubled by, I still come towards the end of a pretty long life, satisfied that when the American people want to, when the priorities are straightened out, we can take care of our domestic problems.

But then I come back to where you are. You made a reference to speeches made by Bob McNamara, the President of the World Bank, in which he indicated that the aid-giving countries, or the developed countries, ought to set aside about one per cent of their GNP for help to the peoples of the poor countries. Now, that is not a World Bank goal. That is a goal set by the UN itself about ten years ago and which all countries, including our own, have paid lip service to.

Let us suppose you are dealing with people in the part of the country where you come from, you are talking to them and they raise this question, "How do you justify spending money in some far off place and trying to do something to help people when we have so many problems at home, unemployment and all the rest?" They are concerned about crime on the street, about the rate of social change in this country, a laxity in standards of morality, lack of confidence in public officials, and wars, etc. What most people are really concerned about is what their community or their state or this nation is going to look like, ten years from now, 30 years from now. "Is this going to be a place that will provide as many opportunities for our children and grandchildren as it did for those of us in this room now, or for our progenitors who went before us? Is this going to be a decent place for them to live, with some aspirations and putting some quality into living?"

But let us face up to it: you cannot answer those questions until you have asked the prior question, "What is the world going to be like?" This is a shrinking world. Last week we saw the fourth batch of astronauts — or was it the fifth? — come back from the moon with their interesting stories, again re-emphasizing the smallness of this planet, how unimportant really all the people on earth are in the overall structure of the universe.

Let us get back just to this planet. Polluted air doesn't pay any attention to national boundaries. It flows right across. Polluted water doesn't pay any attention to national boundaries. It flows in the rivers or in the oceans across international boundaries. The bugs that cause human diseases and plant diseases and animal diseases don't pay any attention to national boundaries. They start here and they cover the earth.

If you put the whole less developed world together, two-thirds of the people of the world, they have a per capita GNP of a little more than \$200 a year. And in this group we find everything from the great countries, or the countries that are going to be great, like the Brazils and the others that are well along towards development, to those which are very near the bottom, where they are not even on a money economy.

But with modern communications, the people that live in the least advantaged sections of this earth no longer believe it was ordained by God that their relatives, their children, the people in their community, must die because there is no food, or because there is no simple health care. These people do not believe that God ordained there

should be no education for their kids. They recognize that in the developed countries there are opportunities for the people at the bottom of the social ladder to get an education; that it is possible in one generation for the youngster born in the poorest home in the slum or the poorest home in rural America to get an education at public expense and to end up in middle age as a pretty important part in society. They realize that there is something wrong with the world if two-thirds of the people live as they live, and they become unhappy and dissatisfied and you have social commotion of one kind or another.

The final point I want to make in the answer is that national boundaries do not contain social unrest either, and so I say to you and to any other American, because I believe it with conviction, it is not either-or. We have to have decent schools for our own kids, and we have to solve over time the problems of civil rights and cities and the environment. But while we are doing it, we cannot drop out of the world. We have to play some kind of a role. The American people recognized that 24 or 25 years ago when, after the Marshal Plan, Mr. Truman proposed Point Four, which was a pretty popular idea. But it isn't popular at all now. Why?

Well, most of the unpopularity is due to the disenchantment of the American people with the Vietnamese War. Much of Congress' time is spent talking about solving the problems of Southeast Asia. Sooner or later it is going to be settled, and I hope it is going to be settled sooner.

The number one requirement now is that we separate development assistance from military assistance and programs that are designed to attain short-range political objectives for this country. They are necessary, but they should not be mixed, and what has gone sour with the development assistance in this country is the fact that the administrator of aid has been given the responsibility of handling a substantial number of programs in Southeast Asia that the Congress provided money and supporting assistance to do and there has been a good deal of wash-off, unhappy wash-off, on development assistance.

CHANGING ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS

WILLIS C. ARMSTRONG*

The United States has experienced an almost catastrophic decline in its merchandise trade balance within the past year. Our deficit for the first quarter of '72 is \$1.5 billion. Before 1971 we had experienced seventy-seven years of merchandise trade surpluses. When you get a change as marked as that between '70 and '71 in merchandise trade, it does tend to get people pretty excited, especially if they happen to have positions of responsibility in the government. Private business does not mind that much, because it may still be making money, and its own profit margin is not necessarily related to the balance of payments of the country.

The events of August, 1971, I am sure are in everybody's minds. They were sudden; they were abrupt; they were described by some people in foreign countries as "shock treatment." I believe the Japanese term is "shocku."

The domestic and international measures were, however, a set of actions which were necessitated by a very serious situation which had developed, not only with respect to the visible merchandise trade deficit, but more importantly to the flight of capital from the U.S., primarily to Europe. With a combination of capital flight, serious speculation against the dollar and a declining trade balance, what was done, as you all know, was to close the gold window, through which we had neither bought nor sold gold for some time anyway, and then to move eventually to a modification of the price of gold so that the price at which we do not buy or sell gold is now \$38 instead of the price at which we did not buy or sell gold, which was \$35. The gold price change was a part of a package negotiated in stages over the autumn and finally agreed upon at the Smithsonian Institution here in Washington on the 18th of December. We now have a new pattern of exchange rates. The expectation is that this should do a good deal to change the balance of payments picture. But obviously it will take some time.

When I was in London from '64 to '67, sterling was in trouble. Everybody looked at the month's trade figures in the United States, and everybody had a fit every month and said, "What are we going to do?"

But the measures taken by the government in London in '66 and '67 eventually resulted in a whacking big surplus in merchandise trade and in the British balance of payments, partly because of the devaluation, and partly because of some domestic measures. The devaluation of the dollar, or the revaluation of other currencies should do something substantial over time to change the picture for the United States.

Meanwhile, there are things that need to be done at home. I think that the most obvious, urgent and immediate need is to improve productivity in this country to make sure that we are competitive in foreign markets, which in certain respects we are not at this point. Next we have to improve our salesmanship and marketing, so that we sell people things they might want instead of things we happen to have that they probably do not want.

One of the problems in this area is that our foreign trade represents, say, four percent of our GNP, and therefore you can have a highly successful and very large business in this country without getting into international business. This simply is not true for the other major trading countries in the world. Any business of any importance in other countries is likely to have some international activities. But because you can have such a large business here without getting involved in international affairs, and because exports are sometimes tiresome, a lot of companies simply do not go into exporting.

There is another area that is important in this field of productivity. It centers on what we are doing in research and development. For a long time our research and development in this country was way out ahead of everybody else's in the area of applied technology. It is still high, and private company spending on this is higher in the U.S. than it is in other countries proportionately. But a great deal of government money that used to be spent in research and development on space or military programs, is no longer being spent.

Nobody really has done a very successful job of identifying how much spin-off you get from that kind of research and development when you look for its effects in the civilian economy. But I think we need in this country to take a careful look at what is

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going on in research and development and to make sure that enough effort is being put into this field to keep us competitive in foreign markets.

Some people say that perhaps we should not bother to get so involved in foreign markets; why don't we just take care of ourselves? This overlooks the fact that we are increasingly a country in deficit, in terms of raw materials and particularly energy-producing raw materials.

We are increasingly dependent on foreign oil; we are running out of natural gas; we are in trouble on the energy front. The conservationist movement is of course a fine thing; but if any of you live in New York you will know what has been going on there the last few years; Consolidated Edison needs to expand its capacity. It considers a thermal plant, and people say that pollutes the air; and then it considers a nuclear plant, and people say that it might contaminate everybody if it blew up; so then it considers a hydro plant involving a reservoir up the Hudson river, and people said that would drive the deer out of the woods. But if no expansion occurs, these people are going to be talking a different way when all their air conditioners quit some summer, or when there is no subway service because there simply isn't enough power to go around.

We are increasingly in a deficit position on raw materials and energy supplies, and therefore our import bill for those things is going to tend to go up. Now this is a sort of crisis description of things, and there are a lot of people who are saying, "Well, maybe we have had it — maybe this country hasn't got the gumption to be competitive, hasn't got the stuff to deal with competition, is not willing to apply the self-discipline — particularly, say, in the field of labor, to make it go."

And there are people who are prepared with some simple answers as to how to solve the problem. We have a legislative proposal called the Burke-Hartke Bill. The Burke-Hartke Bill would require licensing before you export technology. You could keep your technology home and admire it. That seems a poor way to make money out of it as I see it. It would also alter the tax laws so that it would be far less profitable to invest abroad, and might make overseas investment impossible, or certainly highly unprofitable. It would limit the import of goods, which would of course induce retaliation, which would limit the export of our goods to other markets. As I see it, this would be a good way to put ourselves out of business, increase unemployment, and get our economy on a high cost and inflationary basis.

I have noticed that most businesses — even a lot of businesses which might sometimes be identified with a need for protection, or with an interest in protection — realize the difficulties with the Burke-Hartke approach and say, "We can't go down this road of protectionism."

I think the Secretary put this very well in quoting Robert Frost: "Before I built a wall I'd ask to know what I was walling in and walling out." In walling out imports, we run the grave risk of walling in the very U.S. exports that we want to encourage. He went on to say that he could not contemplate with any equanimity a situation in which the U.S. was not playing a major economic role in the world, and this of course is closely related to the kind of political role one is in a position to play.

There are some things that can be done in the field of trade which would make our own position better in the long term; they take time. The administration has said that it is prepared to move towards a major trade negotiation, which would of course require legislation first. The legislation could not be considered until 1973, but work will go forward during the current year on this subject.

A general trade negotiation has some reason, some necessity, because the European Common Market is expanding; it is making more and more preferential transactions with other European countries; it is making preferential arrangements with Northern African and other Mediterranean states; and this is a matter of general concern. We are happy to see Europe uniting and becoming more prosperous but we do not want it to happen in such a way that we are shut out.

If we have some authority to negotiate reciprocally on the reduction of trade barriers, then we will be in a position to do some bargaining with the Europeans and thereby improve our own position in that market. The same thing applies to Japan, which is a highly protectionist society in international trade, and where we are hopeful that over time differences can be adjusted by continued negotiation and continued attention to the importance which a reasonable balance in trade with Japan would have for our political relations.

Of course, we also have a program for basic monetary reform. The exchange rate arrangements made in the middle of December were identified as temporary, and the

participants in the Group of Ten are committed to a program of monetary reform. Discussions to this end are going on, as you can tell from the press.

We want a system that will be more responsive to changes in economic situations, and which is not as rigid as the Bretton Woods arrangements were. We have to recognize the new facts of life. In the past, for say 25 years after the war, the U.S. was the dominant economic factor in the world outside the communist countries. It is now not the dominant factor; it is one of several dominant factors. It is matched by Japan and the Common Market. Our relations with Japan, the Common Market and Canada are a very complex set of relationships, because we are competitors, and yet we are also allies and friends. We are also each other's best customers. In these countries we have most of our foreign investments. It is to the developed countries that most of the attention needs to be given.

THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

DONALD R. KING*

BILL LONG**

ALPHONSE F. LAPORTA***

DONALD R. KING: The environmental movement in the U.S. has gained tremendous strength in the last eight or ten years, and I think substantially the curve of international concern is following it. You find a good deal of interest in Europe, for example, that I think parallels our interest two or three years ago. And, of course, this kind of interest is strung out all the way through the developing countries who are perhaps beginning to realize they have an environment. There is a great range of concern and interest that we will be taking with us to the Stockholm Conference.

I would like to tell you first a little bit about the range of activities that we perform with regard to the environment in various international forums. We have, of course, a large number of bilateral agreements from other countries, particularly developed countries, where we are dealing in specific areas of concern to solve particular environmental problems. So, first there are bilateral efforts with other countries. Then we move into various industrialized country forums. There is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Europe that includes Japan, Canada, Australia and others, in which we work with people with very similar concerns on the international scene — largely the world's greatest industrial polluters, I think would be the way to say it. We can work in that kind of a context very well because we have a range of understanding with them and a range of concern; we basically have the same kinds of problems.

There has been another recent development in NATO. It is called the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society — a euphemistic name — that deals in many instances with environmental problems.

And finally we have the UN itself, which has for a long time, of course, had environmental concerns through its various specialized agencies — the World Health Organization, the World Meteorological Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization — a whole string of them that, of course, are already concerned with the kinds of issues that we'll be dealing with at Stockholm.

Now it is a question always, I think, of what is the best kind of an approach to use in any of these areas. The UN has the unique capability to deal on the world scene. There is no other organization that is truly global in nature. This is what makes the Stockholm Conference of such great importance. What will happen is there will be a number of recommendations agreed to by countries at the conference. So if we can start with just a little idea which indicates that world environmental concern is growing, Stockholm itself is going to make an impact. Then, hopefully, the concern will increase so that we can start addressing the kinds of issues that, in all honesty, have not occurred to many of the developing countries up until now.

We are not talking just about pollution issues. We are talking about the management of natural resources and about the environmental aspects of human settlements. You can see that this is a very, very broad concern — involving the following areas: human settlements, natural resources, pollution, development and the environment, and the final one that deals with organization issues, i.e., what we will do after Stockholm to set up a coordinating mechanism.

Now those are the basic conference subject areas with which we will deal which will be apportioned among three committees. But I would rather wait before focusing on those, and my colleagues will talk about their various concerns and aspects of the environmental problem.

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BILL LONG: I would like to take a few minutes to describe some of the more complex and fundamental issues that are beginning to emerge as we approach the Stockholm Environmental Conference. The Conference will in no way resolve these issues which will undoubtedly be with us for some time. Over the past several years, there has been much talk in this country about the need for a new environmental ethic. Many people are beginning to say that we got into this environmental mess because of our runaway technology - technology out of control - and that the only way to decouple ourselves from this treadmill, rapidly speeding us on to doom, is to adopt a new life style. There is much talk these days about the need to renounce the pursuit of GNP in favor of quality of life, to curb our appetites for energy, minerals, all-electric living, two cars in every garage...

We have seen our National Environmental Policy Act being used quite effectively in the courts to hold up construction of power plants and many other types of construction projects where citizens' groups contend create unacceptable environmental hazards and risks. And so, at the U.S. domestic level, as well as in other industrialized nations, we hear more and more talk about a new environmental ethic.

Now I'd like to contrast this briefly with a perspective that exists outside the United States, particularly within the developing countries of the world, and one should bear in mind that as we go into the UN conference in Stockholm, one hundred of the some 130 countries to be represented belong to the so-called "Third World". During the past year we have begun to get a pretty good insight into the environment problems, the interests, the priorities and the capabilities of the developing countries. Many of them have prepared national reports for the Stockholm conference (just as the U.S. has) which represent the initial overview of the state of their environment. There was also a series of UN regional seminars for developing countries held last summer to heighten their interest, to stimulate an awareness, and to identify their perspectives and interests with respect to the nature of national and global environmental problems as well as their willingness to contribute to funding effective solutions.

Out of this we have heard quite clearly that the nations of the world are collectively talking about two classes of environmental problems. The United States and the other industrialized countries are concerned about problems that emanate from the development process itself - degradation of air, water, and land caused by industrialization, agricultural chemicals, construction of dams, etc. Meanwhile the developing countries are acknowledging the fact that they too have environmental problems, but their priorities involve problems associated with poverty, poor sanitation, inadequate housing, unemployment - problems that can only be solved through an intensification of the development process. They are saying to us... "to help us solve our environmental problems - help us expedite attainment of our developmental objectives - help us build more dams, more power plants, more houses - help us industrialize."

So here we have a stark and fundamental difference in perspective, and the question is, can this difference be reconciled as we go into the Stockholm meeting, and ultimately resolved based on internationally agreed action programs which will emerge from the conference? Brazil certainly has been the leading spokesman on behalf of the developing world, and its representatives have said in the UN General Assembly that while the developed world - the U.S. - is talking about population control, Brazil desires more population to open up the Amazon Region; while the wealthy nations talk of curbs on industry, Brazil is looking to attract heavy industry.

I have mentioned this principally to make the point that if one thinks that operating unilaterally at a domestic level he is going to solve the environmental problems in today's world - either his own environmental problems or those of anyone else - I personally believe that he is gravely mistaken. If one accepts this, then it strongly argues for the need for the U.S. to actively seek solutions to environmental problems in international fora. If we cut back our energy consumption, if we cut back the use of DDT, we might buy valuable time. But as long as India and other developing countries are building DDT plants to fill the gap, I would submit that our unilateral efforts certainly are not going to solve the problems over the long term, principally due to the global character of the atmosphere and oceans.

I would like to describe briefly three sets of issues that are going to be taken up at the Stockholm Conference within the agenda topic that Don King identified as "Development and Environment". This particular topic is the key plug-in point for the developing countries, because they see this as their best opportunity for addressing their priority concerns. There are a number of interrelated issues involved, but I will treat them in

three sets. The first is the relationship between environmental policies and international commerce.

The developing countries are very much concerned that adoption by the U.S. and other industrialized nations of more stringent environmental standards will have an adverse impact on their own development. For instance, if our Food and Drug Administration, in the interests of safeguarding consumers, decides that more rigid standards for pesticide residues on sugar are in order, the U.S. consumer undoubtedly says, "Fine...we like this added margin of safety." But the Philippines and other countries that are exporting sugar to the United States will have few kind words for what to them is nothing but a new barrier to trade.

There are any number of such illustrations and I think it is well to keep in mind that, whatever we can do to protect ourself here at home, there is bound to be some ramification, some impact somewhere in other parts of the world.

Another set of issues involves industries which operate abroad. I think this can be put in perspective by recounting that Japan, at a recent UN Seminar on Environment and Development held in Bangkok for developing countries, announced that it was looking for opportunities to export its heavy industry, since the small, crowded islands of Japan are no longer able to absorb an additional pollution burden. The Japanese representative asked the developing countries to examine their interests in accepting these industries, first of all because the developing countries need the industry, and secondly, their environment can safely handle the waste products. It is undoubtedly true that, for the present at least, many developing nations have a large assimilative capacity for pollutants.

So the developing countries now are faced with a dilemma. They are certainly sensitized to the fact that industrial pollution is a potential problem, and they have repeatedly stated that they don't want to follow the same paths as the developed industrialized countries have taken. But, on the other hand, they want the industry. And if we are not going to give them any better guidance than we have up to this point on how to handle industrial pollution, they will most certainly retrace our steps — sacrificing environmental quality for the benefits derived from industrialization. For our part, we must decide what the U.S. posture should be toward our own industries which operate overseas. If one puts more stringent environmental requirements on U.S. overseas industry, what does this do to the competitive position of U.S. industry vis-a-vis industries of other developed nations. Obviously this is a difficult problem, ill-served by simplistic solutions.

The third class of basic and complex issues of particular concern to developing countries is the relationship between environment policies and foreign assistance. Many countries rely on foreign assistance obtained either through bilateral relationships with the U.S. and other countries or from multilateral donor institutions such as the World Bank, to help them achieve their developmental goals. And the current question is, what should the posture of AID and other development institutions be with regard to providing aid for development projects which will create significant environment damage? Should we now *require* that environmental safeguards are built into these foreign projects as a condition of the financial assistance? Even if the assistance agencies offer to finance the safeguards, the developing world is telling us, "that's fine, but again our first priority is getting on with the development, and this means that we want to build more roads, more power plants, more houses; we want more industry. If you are telling us now that you are going to give us additional money for environmental safeguards, don't expect our gratitude because we know that this requires a trade-off on our part...we realize that development assistance budgets are fixed, or are shrinking, we'd rather have the money available for a new road construction project." And so we have another set of issues revolving around the environmental aspects of foreign assistance policies.

There are many other issues. I have tried merely to cite several of the most basic, complex, and controversial. I have tried to make the point that there is a fundamental difference in perspective between the developed and developing countries of the world, and it is going to be hard to meld these disparate points of view. We certainly need to work diligently and effectively in international fora if we are successful in solving the most critical of either our own domestic or the global environmental problems.

And lastly, I believe we are certainly going to have to get smarter in terms of gaining better understanding of the origin and character of problems, how to build the institutional and legal frameworks required to solve the problems, and how to give developing countries safe but viable alternatives for development activities we might

judge to be hazardous to the quality of the environment. It is not enough to tell such countries that because the dam they want to build will have several environmental consequences they shouldn't construct it; we have got to be able to say, "if you want water and electricity, here is a better way to do it."

ALPHONSE LA PORTA: I would just like to briefly recap some of the objectives of the Stockholm conference and some of the things that we are looking for to come out of the conference, and also to just very briefly acquaint you with some of the United States proposals for global action in the environmental field. We have all agreed that we want to spend the bulk of the time answering your questions and getting down to the nitty-gritty of what you are really interested in, so I will try to make my presentation brief.

Basically, we are looking forward to the Stockholm conference, not as the culmination of an effort to get action in the environment field, but as the very beginning of action. The Stockholm conference is not going to solve all of the world's environmental problems. What the Stockholm conference is going to do is to bring nations together to, first of all, assess the degree of global interest in the environment; secondly, to provide the means and the will to act on a global basis to attack some of these environmental problems; and third, to set up a framework for continuing action. We envision that there will be continuing review of international environmental programs as we proceed in the next few years and the next ten, fifteen, twenty years. The Stockholm conference may very well be followed by another conference in five years or ten years, to assess where we have been and what we have been doing wrong and how we can adjust our approaches.

But, nevertheless, we are looking for the Stockholm conference to provide a framework for international action. Now when we say international action, I would like to just very briefly list some of the areas that we as a government — the United States government — are interested in. First of all, on the question of monitoring, the United States government strongly supports proposals to create an integrated global network of environmental monitoring, including the atmosphere, oceans, health monitoring, monitoring of air pollution in cities, also monitoring in the very broadest sense of determining where there has been erosion of soils or other unacceptable deterioration. Basically, we want the UN to coordinate national efforts in this respect.

Secondly, we look to the United Nations system for further enhancing or further promoting scientific research and the accumulation of knowledge on various problems of a global nature. We would also hope that the UN might act as an information exchange system, not as a vast computer bank, as it were, to just divest itself of thousands of monographs on any particular subject, but more as a linkage or control system. For instance, nation A comes to the UN and says, where can I get information on water pollution? Then the UN would direct them to several nations which have very active and very complete programs in water pollution.

Also we are looking to the United Nations to assist in the process of establishing international environmental quality criteria, not with the idea that on a global basis these standards can be enforced, because to be frank we have very real political problems in this direction. I think Mr. Long has alluded to some of the problems and perspectives between the developing countries and the developed nations which would make this politically impossible, at least at this time. But basically, we want to try to establish basic standards on a global basis for air quality, water quality and so forth.

We look to the United Nations to provide additional inputs as far as education, training and assisting the developing nations in organizing their own capabilities to manage environmental programs in their own countries. For instance, in the education field, we would hope that the UN would move into the development of educational materials and training of secondary school teachers in environmental subjects, of college level teachers, also conducting training of regional technicians on a regional basis, and similar programs.

Also we hope that the United Nations could add some stimulus to the setting up of regional environmental institutes — not that the UN should take over the management of such institutes, but basically to help these institutes get started. These institutes could then give guidance and concentrate on problems of particular relevance to a specific group of nations. We would also look for the United Nations to provide some crystallization of views and provide a framework for action in the conservation field. And to this end, the United States government has proposed the development of a convention, an international legal convention, the World Heritage Trust, which would provide a frame-

work for the preservation of natural areas and also areas of sites of cultural significance. There would be an international register of these sites, standards set up for the management of these sites, and in cases where countries, particularly the developing countries, do not have the means to manage them on the style of the U.S. National Park Service, to provide some selected assistance to shape up their machinery for protecting these important areas.

And lastly, we have a large category of action called human settlements. Basically this involves encouraging an integrated approach to urban and rural development, water quality, water use, energy use, health, population control and the like. There remains a great deal to be done in the developing world, and having been stationed in a developing country, I have seen the ravages of unparalleled and uncontrolled growth of urban population. I might add as a statistic that Djakarta, Indonesia grew from a city of about a million and a half, to a city of five million or so in about eight years. This is a fantastic growth in population, and obviously, public facilities, sewage, water, and so forth, just have not been able to keep pace with this kind of rapid urbanization.

Now, very briefly, I would like to tell you how we propose that the United Nations do all of this. We are proposing that a fund for environmental activities be set up in the United Nations. President Nixon, in his State of the World message, announced this proposal, and the United States pledged to do its fair share as far as providing financial resources to the fund. Fair share in this context means that the United States will provide 40 per cent of the total amount of contributions to the fund in the first five years. We anticipate that to launch a minimally effective program for the environment in the United Nations context, that the United Nations will have to have at its disposal about a hundred million dollars for the initial five-year period. Therefore, the United States would be obliged, provided other nations contribute, to contribute as much as 40 million dollars.

Now, secondly, we have to manage this fund, and to see that these environment programs are actually carried out, we propose that an office of the administrator of global environmental programs be established on almost the highest level in the United Nations. And when I say "almost the highest level", the Secretary of the United Nations is the highest level and we want this man working directly under him, but yet somewhat apart from the regular UN Secretariat. In this respect, the environment Administrator would be analogous to the Administrator of the UN Development Program.

Thirdly, we propose the creation of a Commission for the Environment, to be placed under the aegis of the Economic and Social Council of the UN. This environment Commission would have the responsibility for monitoring the effectiveness of the programs, for giving intergovernmental guidance to the Administrator, and to oversee operation of the fund.

We also propose that an Environmental Coordinating Board be set up. Now, this is purely an administrative mechanism, but it is one in which we would bring together the top environmental administrators in all of the UN specialized agencies. I wish to just make the point at this stage that it is the existing specialized agencies who will be charged with carrying out these programs within their respective spheres of competence. For instance, the World Meteorological Organization will have a large responsibility in carrying out programs relating to air pollution. The World Health Organization will have responsibilities with regard to health quality criteria. UNESCO will have responsibilities in the education and training field, and so on down the line.

We expect that almost all UN bodies and also non-UN bodies, such as research institutes and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, will also be involved in this effort. The Environmental Coordinating Board we have proposed would bring these administrators together and would serve as an instrument by which the Administrator would control his program.

INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF NARCOTICS

NELSON G. GROSS*

In the Department of State the emphasis is on the supply side as opposed to the demand side in narcotics. The demand side is worked on by the special drug abuse office headed by Dr. Jaffe out of the White House. He has the responsibility to deal with rehabilitation programs, education, prevention, anything relating to the demand, and specifically in the domestic area. Secondly, a new office was created about two months ago for special drug enforcement headed by Myles Ambrose in the Justice Department, and that relates, again, primarily to the domestic side, to the pushers on the streets.

What we are working on in the State Department is the supply side, and that is organized through a Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, which the President established last September. The Committee is chaired by Secretary Rogers. Also sitting on the Committee are Secretary Connally of Treasury, the Attorney General, the CIA director, the Secretary of Agriculture, Ambassador Bush of the United Nations, and Secretary Laird of Defense, all of whom represent the agencies and departments that are involved in some way in international narcotics.

In turn, the Cabinet Committee has a working group on which I sit for the Department of State, and each one of the other departments is represented: BNDD, which is the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in the Department of Justice, customs officials, Dr. Jaffe of the special action office — in order to get the mix and the blending between the demand and the supply, and an agricultural representative.

The next organizational level is in the State Department, where we have inter-agency task forces in each one of our geographic areas. For example, in Secretary Sisco's area, which is the Near East, we have a regional group and a narcotic coordinator for an area which is extremely important in narcotics, in that it includes Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Within the geographic areas, each country desk has someone who is specialized in narcotics. The inter-agency task forces have representation from each of the other departments named, so that we can have the input that is required.

Out in the field, the Ambassador himself heads the country team effort in order to develop the kind of plan we think is necessary in a given country, depending on whether it is a producing country, a transit country, or a victim country. We are now in the process of developing Narcotics Control Action Plans for fifty-seven countries. Some of these you know very well from the press. Obviously, the cases of Turkey, Mexico, France and Thailand are being implemented now, and are, in fact, well underway. Many others are proceeding well and some are just in the very beginning or talking stages.

In addition to our bilateral programs, we are moving in a multi-national way through the United Nations, for example, which has established a United Nations Special Drug Abuse Fund. The United States has contributed two million dollars and will provide an equal amount in this next fiscal year. Other nations have together contributed another million, and the program is just one year old. We have just succeeded in amending the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which is the international treaty regulating the production of opium. That protocol was signed in March by over forty countries in Geneva, where I represented the United States. The President within the next few days should forward that amending protocol to the Senate for ratification.

And then there are many regional approaches which we try to initiate. Sometimes we do not get involved because we wish to avoid an excessive United States presence. But we encourage other nations to take action. For example, the Australians were encouraged to sponsor as they did a regional group in Southeast Asia; Turkey was requested to work on an ad hoc group in the Near East, which they are doing; and President Pompidou is working on a European Group in the European Economic Community.

QUESTION: You mentioned that the agreement between the United States and Thailand has been implemented. Last Friday night, NBC in its Chronolog program, carried a rather substantial piece on the Golden Triangle, and there were some very serious implications that the Department of State realized what was going on up there, and that because of the delicate conditions with Thailand nothing was being done. Do you have anything to say on that?

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NELSON GROSS: We do realize what is going on in Thailand and we have realized it for quite some period of time. I did not see the program, although I know I was on it for a minute or two taken from a half-hour taping session. So what they take out of the clips, I do not know. I do not know what the final package looked like, but there was a constant theme in the questions that we were trying to cover up something. The State Department, and the whole United States Government for that matter, has been totally open on the question of narcotics. We go around the world telling everybody we have 500,000 addicts and we have got to get such and such done about it. No other country will do this. Other countries will not acknowledge they have a problem, which is one reason why it is so difficult to get them moving.

Now in the case of Thailand, this is the only country that has an agreement with the United Nations Drug Abuse Fund. That was started in December and is now moving forward. It is a crop substitution program. We have ourselves approximately 10 to 12 Bureau of Narcotics enforcement people in Thailand working in the area operationally. I wonder what the Congressman who made these charges, who by the way never went to Thailand, would think if a foreign government, for example, came to his district or to us and said: "Look, we are having trouble with amphetamines produced in the U.S., and we would like to put some of our intelligence and enforcement officials in your district, to work operationally." This is not an easy thing, yet the government of Thailand has taken these agents and has no inhibitions whatsoever on their working in that country. We have developed some specific projects there. One is a team in the north, in the Chaing Mai area across from the Burma border where most of the production is, which is trying to interdict opium, morphine base, and heroin as it comes down from the hills up there. We are working on the trawlers as they leave the Bangkok area on their way up to Hong Kong and we had a very large seizure in December of approximately twenty-five hundred pounds of opium and well over four hundred pounds of morphine.

So the beginnings have been made. Perhaps the criticism applies here that we had not done much prior to the outbreak of heroin use in the Vietnam war. But people were not that much aware of it, frankly, before that occurrence. But these are some of the things that are being done now, and the big production, by the way, is in Burma, which produces illicitly approximately four hundred tons of opium. It makes Turkey look mighty small.

QUESTION: With regard to the situation in Laos, I have heard that U.S. supported forces, Laotian forces and members of the Laotian military have been openly profiting on the opium trade in the area, and I was wondering what you knew about it and what the situation actually is?

NELSON GROSS: I think that is quite true up until approximately September of 1971, because up until that time there was no law against opium production or in transmitting opium or opium derivatives in Laos. It was perfectly legal. There was a well-known general, General Ouan Rathikoun, who was a trafficker in opium derivatives. But again I say it was not illegal.

Beginning last spring and summer we began to recognize the situation, using intelligence resources to determine what was happening out there. We prodded the government of Laos and they, under the leadership of Souvanna Phouma, quickly enacted a law which is now being enforced. And we have quite tight enforcement in Laos. I do not think you will find any government official, certainly none that we know of, involved any longer. All of the heroin labs, to our knowledge, have been driven out of that country or seized. There have been huge seizures of acetic anhydride, which is the chemical ingredient necessary to make heroin. In fact, one seizure was large enough to make three tons of heroin. That would supply us for half a year.

QUESTION: I have also heard reports that U.S. aircraft, specifically equipment belonging to Air America, was actually used for the transport of drugs during that period. Is there any truth to that allegation?

NELSON GROSS: We have no doubt that all aircraft from different entities, both civil and military, were used and have been used for the illicit transit of opium derivatives. Air America was probably included because strictures were not that tight. They are now. We have new operational procedures out there, and while you could not guarantee that there is never any slippage, because heroin obviously is very small, I am certain that this is not a normally patterned route any longer, if it was a normal one at any time.

QUESTION: Turkey is one of our NATO powers. You mentioned Turkey as one of the suppliers and you also mentioned the fact that Burma was the largest producer. My question is, what are we doing to stop the flow of narcotics coming from these countries

that are not necessarily our allies, such as Burma?

NELSON GROSS: Well, Burma is probably the most difficult case we have. By the way, when I say producer, I do not mean to indicate that it is a legal producer as Turkey was. Turkey under the Single Convention was a licit producer. The difficulty was that they were unwittingly not collecting all of the opium production, and so therefore a huge amount got into the illicit traffic. In the case of Burma, all of that production is illegal. They are not a legal exporter of opium. Unfortunately they have most of this production in uncontrolled areas such as the northeasterly provinces, the Shan States for example, where there are insurgents.

Much as that government would like to stop the opium production and trafficking, because the insurgents feed on it, they are unable to do so. And Burma, as you pointed out, is a non-aligned country. So non-aligned they say, that they did not even go to a meeting of the non-aligned countries. We have great difficulties there. We have had some conversations and we are trying to determine some ways in which we can interdict at the borders.

QUESTION: It has been reported in the press in Taiwan, the the People's Republic of China has been promoting or producing opium. Do you have any information on that?

NELSON GROSS: Of course I get this question all the time, and it is often with an allegation, increasingly being made, that this administration is doing something to cover up. Let me assure you that that just is not the case at all. As I say, we have been more than open in delivering the facts as to narcotics trafficking. The fact is, in recent years we do not have any evidence of any opium coming out of the People's Republic of China. There is just no evidence to indicate this, and we have said so. We know where the opium in Southeast Asia is coming from. It is coming from what they call the Golden Triangle area, which is on the border of Burma, Thailand and Laos, and principally from Burma. We know approximately what the figures are, and this is where it is coming from.

QUESTION: There have been several reports of countries that have had addiction problems similar to ours being very successful in eliminating those problems. Could you tell me whether they do it largely through prevention or education?

NELSON GROSS: The People's Republic of China is one of those countries, to the best of our knowledge, that have eliminated or have gone a long way toward eliminating the problem. We do not know exactly how it was done, but they certainly used methods which we could not use in our society. Some of the addicts I understand were actually quarantined and removed from society for a lengthy period of time in order to cut the demand. And then a very intensive drive was put onto the pushers and crops were burned out.

QUESTION: You seem to be putting the emphasis on the punitive measures rather than the educational. My question is, which seems to be more effective? Do you have any evidence that it is more effective to begin with an early education program or to go after the pushers?

NELSON GROSS: Let me take another country. Iran is one of the few other victim countries. And it is difficult to understand why in Turkey there is no really significant use of opium, whereas next door in Iran, there is tremendous use. Iran has probably up to 300,000 opium addicts, and at least 50,000 of those are heroin addicts. Perhaps it is that this society in Iran is developing more resources, that it is a society with more available money. I do not know. This is something that Dr. Jaffe is working on. I am really not competent to give you a flat opinion of it. All I know is that we have got to work on the supply and the demand at the same time. Neither one will solve it. Just to create the extreme, if you were totally successful in solving this from the demand viewpoint, and you cut off all demand, well then you would have hundreds and hundreds of thousands of poppy farmers with a product which they could not sell. And we would have really a drastic problem if that happened today.

This is why we are working through the Agriculture Department and the United Nations to develop techniques for crop substitution so that we can get these people on a viable other crop.

QUESTION: I would like to ask two questions. One of the speakers yesterday mentioned that there was a new law regulating growing of opium. And I would like to find out what it is like, what the content of it is, and also, what are we doing to control the flow of our drugs into Mexico?

NELSON GROSS: The Single Convention of 1961, which is the international treaty governing this, allowed only seven countries legally to grow and export opium. In effect,

it is now down to only one. After Turkey enforces its ban, and this is their last crop this year, and we have no reason to doubt that it will be enforced, the only legal producer of any significance will be India. India produces approximately twelve hundred tons of opium a year. Now we are trying to cut down on the demand. We would like to see the medical profession prescribing less codeine, less opium derivatives, and less morphine, where substitutes are available. And we are trying to work on the development of these substitutes because obviously the more legal production you have, the more likelihood of slippage.

Now what are we doing about amphetamines going to Mexico? The Bureau of Narcotics has an intensive drive there. Under the new law of 1970 they have exercised their powers to cut down production in a considerable way. They have seized many, many clandestine laboratories. And it is not just traffic into Mexico. We have problems with our amphetamines all over Europe. Sweden is a very heavy victim country in amphetamines. And this is something we have got to do. We have got to have our own illicit production controlled, at the same time that we complain about the illicit production in other areas.

QUESTION: I read somewhere that with the concentration of efforts in France and Turkey and elsewhere, the action is shifting to Latin America concerning illicit drug traffic. Could you comment on that?

NELSON GROSS: It is not really a shift to Latin America. In the past two years or so Latin America has been on the principal transit route from Turkey. Turkey and Near East opium production will come across, and the preferred route I am told is overland now, either Bulgaria or Yugoslavia, into Germany or Italy, and then to Marseilles where it is processed into heroin. And from there couriers would come up to Europe and they would take it directly across to New York or Canada and then down. In the last couple of years, the opium has been shipped down to South America and then, using the contrabandista system of smuggling, that heroin has been brought north, along with cocaine, and along with other items.

QUESTION: My question centers around some things that you did mention just in passing. What steps should be taken to control the use, supply, the demand, the growth, toward not becoming addicted, because this is where I feel the problem is.

NELSON GROSS: That is a very broad question. It encompasses the whole subject matter. We are, just to sum up if I can, trying to utilize every known diplomatic device that we can to cut back on the supply end, in addition to every known enforcement and intelligence apparatus, so that we can interdict at our own borders. Our seizures have gone up dramatically. We are probably seizing 25 to 30 percent of what comes into this country.

In addition, this administration has markedly increased its budget on the demand side. There is a bill which was just passed a month ago and signed more recently than that, which would give to Dr. Jaffe's office some 330 million dollars per year for the next several years. This is the demand side.

That is aside from enforcement, domestically, and the budget for that this year is 229 million. When I first went to Turkey in the spring of 1970, the United States had 20 Bureau of Narcotics agents around the world. We had one man sitting in Istanbul, and his territory was Turkey, Iran, Israel, Syria, the whole mid-east area. Now we have approximately 120. We are going to put twenty-five customs intelligence officers overseas, and we are considering more customs advisory people. So every effort is being made on both sides.

MULTINATIONAL COMMUNITY BUILDING**

PAUL R. HANNA*

Let me hasten to declare that I have spent most of my professional career in pursuit of educational strategies for developing the human resources essential to establish and continually improve national communities. I still firmly believe in this goal for Higher Education today. But the rush of change in our time demands new emphases. We must prepare our children and youth for the next great period of history – the building of multinational communities of men.

I will make my point by relating an experience at the University of Nairobi, Kenya. I was recently present at the exercises that opened a new academic year. Present in the University auditorium were the entire entering freshman class, many of the upper classmen, the faculty, and university officials. The speaker for the occasion was the Kenyan Minister to the Commonwealth of Nations Secretariat in London, flown to Nairobi to welcome the entering class and officially to open the new term.

This distinguished statesman, incidentally on leave from the faculty of the university where we were assembled, presented his address in two parts: For the first 30 minutes he spoke earnestly to these young people of his nation, urging them to prepare themselves for service in the development of their native land, Kenya. He reviewed Kenya's problems and promises and exhorted students to use their time and opportunities well while at the university so that they might be able to advance the welfare of their new nation. It was a masterful beginning and I am sure many in the audience dedicated themselves anew to the service of Kenya's development.

But the minister paused at the end of the first half-hour of his presentation and took a different stance. He reminded his audience that there were about 150 nations on planet Earth. He made it strikingly clear that many, perhaps most of these nations are not viable and cannot exist as separate national polities for very long. He used statistics very persuasively to support his assertion that most of the nations of Africa are too small in population or too poor in economic resources to progress without large and improbable foreign funds being poured in year after year. He then called for a different strategy for national survival.

He told of the efforts of several East and Central African nations to form a common market. He reported negotiations underway among the heads of these African nations, meeting in Addis Ababa at the headquarters of the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa. The Minister drew a realistic picture of the tragedy facing the majority of these East and Central African nations if each attempted to build a self-contained national community. But he drew a much more eloquent sketch of the promises the future held if the several nations could, together, build an economic and social network in which all would participate in achieving goals common to all and through which multinational efforts, a much better life of abundance, security, justice, and peace, could be accomplished.

This Kenyan Minister was doing a superb task of recruitment among the university students as well as among the faculty and administration. He was pleading with them to expend a part of the total energy of the institution in multinational teaching, research, and service. He was saying that such university effort would help prepare Kenyans and the Kenyan national community to work with other national communities of like scale and with similar history, values, problems, and promises to survive and prosper. One could infer that the Minister knew he was making a radical proposal. He must have known that such courses, research, and service on the multinational East and Central African Common Market did not exist in his university at the moment. The Minister might have gone further and generalized universally; he could have said that very, very few institutions of higher education in the world are deliberately recruiting and preparing a portion of youth for careers in the private or public sectors of the numerous emerging multinational communities.

The Minister closed his stirring address by boxing the compass. He spoke of the concentric circles of larger than national communities that will have to be constructed if

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our Space Ship Earth is not eventually to become a dead sphere endlessly circling our Sun. He spoke of the necessity for expanding an emerging East and Central African Common Market into an emerging Organization of African Unity, into an emerging Atlantic Community, and ultimately into an emerging World Community.

There was no doubt in my mind that the Minister, through his presentation, not only recruited a goodly number of youth to prepare themselves for careers in the public or private sectors of emerging multinational communities, but that he also made a profound impression on the university's academic and administrative bodies. The leadership of this university understood that not only must the university plan for and contribute to the building of the nation called Kenya, but it must at the same time plan for and contribute to the building of multinational communities that many of us are convinced are the embryos of future civilizations in our Village of Man.

Higher education has been working on this nation-building theme for several centuries. For at least a century, the more influential universities of Europe, Asia, and the Americas, have researched, taught, and serviced their national goals of economic self-sufficiency and political and social unity. The land grant universities and the great private universities in the United States have been deeply immersed in developing the human resources and in basic and applied research on national goals. Increasingly, teacher educators are working with colleagues in other professional colleges and with scholars, in the disciplines of the sciences and humanities. This cooperative effort has resulted in an upsurge of dedication among teacher educators deliberately to use schooling to improve the quality of our national life, be it in ecological balance or in equality of education opportunity regardless of race, color, religion, or economic or social status.

I further pay my respects to the pre-collegiate profession that has helped to produce, through schooling, a national labor force capable of producing annually half of the world's goods and services.

But to return to the theme that the role of higher education be broadened to prepare teacher educators to build *multinational* communities. Again I will use a specific example to make my point. The Mekong River drains and geographically determines partial borders of Thailand and Laos and bisects Cambodia and South Vietnam. The Mekong is a wild, unharnessed river, the eleventh largest in the world.

For more than two decades the United Nations has had a Mekong Commission, international in composition, at work on the engineering plan for harnessing this great river system so that its waters can be used as transportation routes among the four nations; develop electrical power to serve the homes and future industries; store water behind dams to prevent floods; generate electricity; provide dependable irrigation; and do many related projects that will benefit the millions of people living in the four-nation area.

But what about the humans who will inherit the harnessed river area? At this moment, the region threatens to burst into violent conflagration. Even if the present crisis cools, will the people who live in this strife-torn Southeast Asian peninsula have the positive mental attitudes, the concepts, and the competencies necessary to navigate the river, to substitute electrical power for muscle power, to use the stored irrigation waters to grow two crops each season, etc.?

I, of course, must assume that eventually this area will be free of invasion and disruption from the north.

If nothing happens to educate these people, the grand and humanitarian scheme of the U.N. Mekong Commission engineers will prove to be a tragic farce. There may never be order, peace, and plenty in this multinational region until the people know they have much more in common than they have differences. Children can be taught to hate. Likewise, children can be taught to respect other peoples and to work together.

To date the schools and the colleges of the four nations have done nothing to work cooperatively to construct a curriculum that teaches youngsters and oldsters the desirable goals of peace, plenty, and justice that could emerge from the harnessing of a river that is common to all four nations. The higher educational institutions of these nations have done little or nothing to research the social, economic, and political problems that must be solved if the harnessing of the river is to give these people what they want. With rare exceptions, the young are not being trained to serve the public or private networks of the emerging multinational community of the Mekong River.

SEAMES, the South East Asian Ministers of Education Secretariat, has not even started to answer the all important questions of what the children and youth of all four

nations need to learn about their common interest in the Mekong River Project and what needs to be done to develop multinational networks to make the great engineering enterprise work. To date, education is almost exclusively focused on nation-building and on national sovereignty. Unless the greater benefits of multinational solutions are clear to the people as a result of good school and university research and teaching, all the bold physical feats of harnessing the Mekong may rust and forever erode the hope of the people for achieving a better life.

And what, if anything, are our institutions of higher education around the world doing about the multinational communities that must come into being if this and many other great adventures are to succeed? The answer is: Virtually nothing.

Why should not the nations now unilaterally sending Peace Corps volunteers abroad join forces with the four nations of the Mekong and send to the region, multinational teams of older experts working alongside idealistic youth from all nations?

Why should not a university, say in Thailand, take on a United Nations contract to prepare Peace Corps volunteers from Germany, Sweden, United States, Japan, France, etc., and then send into villages in the four nations, multinational teams to help the local people learn how to use irrigation water and fertilizers to grow more food and fibre?

Why should not a university, say in Viet Nam, manage a contract for a consortium of European, African, American, and Asian institutions of higher education to pursue research on the legal bases for navigation on the international Mekong River; on economic problems of the transmission of electrical power across national borders; or on the social problems of population movement from rural to urban areas?

We are fully aware that the solutions of more and more problems of our generation have multinational dimensions. By their very nature, air pollution through atomic wastes, sea water pollution through human and industrial sewage, wars in the Middle East or Southeast Asia, or epidemics through rapid global mass transportation, and hundreds of other threatening problems can only be solved by a change of mental outlook and of basic concepts that realize the absolute necessity of creating multinational communities of men.

We are already well on our way to living in these expanded communities. Daily, all of us are affected by the existence of the European Common Market, by the Organization of American States, by the Pacific Science Congress, or by the existence of the International Red Cross. What we need in higher education throughout the Americas, for instance, is a tooling up of our curriculum programs so that we no longer, in school textbooks, treat each nation in the Americas as a sovereign and isolated nation; rather we need programs in teacher education that will deal with the Alliance for Progress, the Inter-American Commission for Economic and Social Security, the Central American Common Market, the new Andean Common Market, etc. Only through such new college programs which are multinational in scope, will our teaching force learn how to develop the essential attitudes, concepts, and competencies that our youth will need to face the future with its expanding communities of men.

I wish to close my plea for the education of human resources to build multinational communities, with an over-simplified statement of the situation. I am fully aware that what I am proposing will brand me in some circles as a starry-eyed idealist. Because chaos or a lifeless Planet Earth are not acceptable options for me, I see no viable alternative to an all-out effort of higher education, world-wide, to use its skill in teaching, research, and service in an effort to identify the common goals that will be impelling enough to overcome the many deterrents that block the way ahead.

Now, the over-simplified statement of our problem. Equate, if you will, each nation with a household in the Village of Man. I submit that each household should face and solve those problems that are naturally and rightfully the concern and responsibility of the members of each household.

But no household in our Village of Man is sufficient unto itself. Only conflict, chaos, and ultimately destruction would result from each household isolating itself from other households. So, many of the problems common to all households could be solved by adding household strength to household strength. Only as the households in the Village of Man learn to work together to solve the increasing complexity of more and more congested conditions, only thus will the Village of Man survive, prosper, and live in justice and peace.

Higher Education? We must, of course, educate for nationhood. But, is it not time for us in the academic community of Planet Earth to educate for multinational survival and development?

PART II

FOREIGN POLICY AND HIGHER EDUCATION

THE CHALLENGE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TO HIGHER EDUCATION

PAUL G. ORR*

Higher education in the United States has performed three major functions: teaching, research and service. These functions have been performed unevenly and with varying degrees of success. Different institutions have selected one or two of the functions as their primary thrust. Higher education in the United States has been charged and challenged with many responsibilities but I suggest to you that the following two are most relevant to leaders in higher education who are present at this National Foreign Policy Conference: (1) all people need to be educated better than they have been in the area of international affairs and world responsibility and (2) higher education needs to examine and modify many premises which appear now to guide most decisions.

As an example of one of society's most crucial problems, I suggest to you that people who are being educated today are not learning one of life's most important lessons — the ability to analyze a complex problem in a systematic manner and arrive at a conclusion that is rational and in perspective. In order to accomplish this, we probably need a new definition for intelligence which includes affective learning. To clarify the example and to focus on the topic of this conference, I suggest further to you that many in higher education charged with clarifying issues are in fact muddling them by not developing a reasonable frame of reference through which major issues may be examined.

In spite of what often appears to be great division, I believe there is more basic agreement than there may appear to be about what our goals and objectives are and what they should be. The disagreement, I believe, is related to our status and about the strategy followed in our eternal quest to move from where we are to where we want to be. The problem of communication may result from statements in which status, strategy, and goals and objectives are blended into statements that relate appropriately only to strategy. Disagreement can be the basis for deliberation, debate and better direction, or it can become vituperative and divisive and lead to costly delay. I make no plea to reduce disagreement, I do plead for a better clarification of the issues and for some frame of reference to help us maintain perspective. At the risk of over-simplification, our goals and objectives are relatively stable and represent basically what we all have in common; our status changes as conditions change and is best characterized by the rapid rate of change; strategy represents the planning, priority setting, and decisions made about how best to move from where we are (our status) to where we want to be (our goals and objectives) and strategy represents the area in which there are a number of diverse opinions.

OUR STATUS

Let us examine where we are by highlighting a few of the facts in this very complex world:

1. At least fifteen years ago, most people who really thought seriously about the world began to operate from a change in basic premise about world affairs: that global confrontation using the power available to destroy was no longer a sensible alternative for any country or any alliance: Traditional "war psychology" (build hate for the enemy, et cetera) was too dangerous to be used by a country with sophisticated nuclear weapon systems: Like it or not — the peoples of the world know about and rightfully demand a fair share in the benefits of civilization: Lastly, there has been acknowledgement of the interdependence of all peoples (and governments) of the world, for practical as well as altruistic reasons.

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2. Pursuing any objective has increasingly become more complex as the post World War II bipolar relationship of two superpowers has been increased in number by the addition of other countries and groups of countries with comparable military and/or economic strength.
3. There is an increasing incidence of cases of lack of confidence in society's institutions, of all kinds at all levels, fostered by many people for personal gain, by others from frustration because they cannot comprehend, by others who for unknown reasons are fascinated by the bizarre; but also in many cases because most of society's institutions have not changed in response to changed conditions as much or as rapidly as they could.
4. (Combining Churchill and Dickens), our form of government is the worst form except every other form and it is having its best of times and its worst of times. We are in an era when society's institutions should be increasingly mutually supportive to enable us as a people to bring all appropriate resources to bear on resolution of problems and realization of potentials. Even though we have made progress, we have not accelerated it as we must; we have not agreed to work in concert when we should. The net result has been a dangerous unevenness in the treatment of our problems. Even though shocking, we have not yet learned how to work together and our beautiful and great country is being scarred — internally and externally — as a result. Our democracy is, by definition, cumbersome, but certainly not unworkable.

These points are simple and incomplete but, hopefully, do represent challenges to all of us that we must constantly orient ourselves to the future as conditions change and we must do so quicker and better than we have in the past. "Where we are" certainly is dynamic and obsessed longings for "where we used to be" are not only counterproductive but also dangerous. As a minimum, do we not agree that our status is different.

SOME COMMON GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

Can we also agree on "where we want to be?" I believe we can! Do we not agree that as a people we subscribe to certain basic international objectives: a peaceful world, security while we help to build such a world, freedom and liberty and self-determination, economic growth for ourselves and others so that indeed the goal of making the benefits of civilization available to all peoples is feasible, and the development of law that permits differences — nationally and internationally — to be settled without violence? I believe we do subscribe to these common objectives and others, and that indeed these objectives represent the very essence of what we all believe and desire for ourselves, our children, and for all people.

A MAJOR PROPOSITION

Hopefully, at this point in this paper a major proposition has been identified; simply that we, as a people, do indeed have a great amount of agreement on our status, and on our goals and objectives; or as stated previously "where we are" and "where we want to go." I believe it should be equally obvious that strategy building to move us from where we are to where we want to go in international relations is both a concern and a responsibility of all of our institutions: government at all levels, education at all levels, media of all kinds, and so forth, down the line to each individual. Each group, however, has a primary role and my topic today deals with higher education and its role in moving from where it is to where it should be if it is to meet its responsibilities. The obvious question is "why haven't we made more progress?", but I suggest to you that the substantive question should be "why have we as a society tended to lose perspective about our problems in relation to our successes and potential?" *The implications of this question have highly significant meaning generally for the topic treated in this National Foreign Policy Conference for Leaders in Higher Education and specifically for the topic assigned to me, "The Challenge of International Relations to Higher Education."*

My thesis is simply that higher education has not responded as well as it should have to the challenge of international relations. We are not alone in our failure to respond adequately but we (higher education) may well have the major responsibility to society to help people not to confuse criticism of the strategy being followed at any point in time with the *facts of our status* and its evolving nature, and the *commonality*

of our goals and objectives, which are more stable and which guide us as a people. Our primary mandate from the people is to teach; our responsibility is to teach as well as we can; our circumstance is that we are ill-structured and inappropriately conceived for present conditions; our challenge is to do much better.

THE CHALLENGE TO HIGHER EDUCATION

Higher education may well be the only component in our increasingly complex society which has the continuity, freedom and the capability to develop some of the models which society needs. It is a fact that many of our internal problems in the United States and the problems of international relations are inter-related, and their treatment requires a multidisciplinary approach within higher education and also the linkage of higher education to other institutions and agencies. I doubt that any other part of the social system is strong enough to explore and develop such linkages without the danger of absorption. Without concerted action, complex problems and the realization of complex opportunities will remain elusive.

THE THRUST FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE 70's

Higher education can, and I believe, will become more responsive to the challenge of international relations in the 1970's. I would suggest that its major goal should be to provide a better balanced education for all people in the facts of international life, and particularly that the peoples of the world are interdependent not only for practical interests but also in the altruistic interests of morality, cultural vitality and mankind's hope throughout the world that man in general may reach his greatest potentials.

A CHANGE IN PREMISE

Higher education, and other organizations, are not, in my opinion, unresponsive because of bad intent, or meanness, or malevolence. I believe they *are* organization bound and laden with traditions which have worked well in the past, but which have given rise to premises which must be questioned and often revised or replaced with new ones. Until certain premises are modified, higher education cannot fulfill its role. I suggest that important among these are the following questionable premises with some suggestions for new directions and a few cursory comments:

Questionable Premise

New Direction

(Commentary)

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|---|---|
| 1. International education, including international relations, is a discipline best treated in a discrete form. | 1. Almost all disciplines and areas of study have a normal and vital international/intercultural extension which should be added. |
|---|---|

International relations, language studies and area studies as disciplines have their place for limited purposes, but they cannot and should not be relied on to provide learning experiences needed by most people about the world in which they live. When all disciplines are extended to include the international dimension, they become not only better balanced, but also more pertinent, and more effective in fostering both understanding and balance; and those who "teach" others what they know — formally, in schools; or informally in life — are better educated (by design, not chance).

2. All disciplines are best housed in an academic department; this assures continuing research, peer evaluation, collegueship, and the opportunity to duplicate oneself. Faculty should identify with their discipline.
2. Most social and behavioral sciences are most functional within an organizational pattern designed in a manner through which structure supports programs. Faculty should identify with the programs their disciplines support in addition to their disciplines.

Academic departments throughout universities have tended to emulate the hard sciences in establishing statements of reasons to justify such a structure. The primary purpose of graduate level hard sciences has been research and the model developed is excellent for research and research-based graduate training, but it is a questionable model for many other areas. The net result of inappropriate structure has been curricula that are compromises and programs that once started cannot be stopped even when their usefulness is past or the demand so low that needless duplication becomes rampant. Most institutions recognize the need for adding the international dimension but are so organization bound that the structure determines programs rather than flexing as needed to best support programs.

3. Formal education is the "melting pot", the vehicle for "Americanization, the glue which melds diverse peoples (cultures) together - it integrates all differences and assimilates different races, cultures, ethnic and linguistic groups into a people with more similarities than differences.
3. Education is a function much broader than formal schooling and all components of the social system educate or mis-educate as much by their own behavior as they do by what they say. Cultural pluralism - in which each child and adult does not suppress his own heritage - is not inconsistent with a democratic society but the essence of it - self-realization, pride, respect for self and others - and vital to a common future need - tolerance for differences.

Perhaps we talked about America as a "melting pot" for so long that we began to believe it and even react against it even when we were not certain it was true. There is no compelling evidence that any factor except economic condition will correlate highly with the number of years of formal schooling at any point in time in our history. Certainly we had more opportunities for unskilled and uneducated people in the past, so leaving school early in order to work was no problem for society. Leaving school early to do nothing is a problem for the individual and for society. Continued efforts by many to expect schools to integrate all differences by suppressing anything different from traditional values, etc., is not only bad education but also bad democracy.

4. "Quality", "excellence", "accreditation" and a host of other similar words in education and society guide any system into a classification matrix which permits society to identify those "who make it" and "those who don't"; that which is better than something else; the more failures, the better the program; the fewer programs approved, the better their quality; and above all, higher education is accountable, thereby, only to itself.

4. "Quality", "excellence", "standards", "accreditation" and other descriptions have great value and worth in education and society. Their greatest value, however, is their use in terms of what a program seeks to accomplish. They are counterproductive when used to perpetuate outdated and useless programs; to act to preserve the status quo; and to function to protect indefensible positions.

Too many children, youth and adults have learned from schooling and society that they are failures rather than having learned how to be productive, useful and participatory members of an increasingly complex society and world. Quality and excellence in the final analysis can never be measured by how many people cannot succeed. Many of our junior and community colleges are establishing excellent models of how higher education can meet the educational needs of people. Higher education can "learn a lesson" from them.

5. International dimensions for education are important, but are optional if other critical needs are unmet and must be given higher priority.

5. International dimensions for education are integral parts which cannot be viewed as options.

Many people continue to view the international dimension of education as a luxury or at least as an option. A goal no less important than survival may well be what society is deciding to opt for.

6. Information is the bridge to understanding across cultures.

6. Many bright, intelligent people (in the cognitive domain) are prejudiced, biased and ignorant of the need for guiding affective learning. Information alone does not lead to better understanding.

The simple answer many people give to our complex questions about international relations is simple to give people more facts – teach them more geography, more history, etc., and they will understand. Cognitive and affective domains of learning should receive equal importance. People who teach at any level should know more about how to teach and how to evaluate their own effectiveness.

The list could continue, however, the purpose was to develop a frame of reference upon which others may build. I have suggested to you that higher education is indeed challenged and, hopefully, we will meet the challenge. The alternative to not doing so is imponderable. Those of us in education can never forget that demagoguery is effective only with people who are not educated to a point above its appeal; also, we can no longer treat ignorance simply as an academic question. Its eradication – in all of its forms – must be our top priority, or indeed all other questions are "academic" in this increasingly complex world.

THE CHALLENGE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TO THE COMMUNITY AND JUNIOR COLLEGE

RAYMOND E. SCHULTZ*

International relations and foreign policy are of extreme importance for those who have teaching and leadership responsibilities in our community and junior colleges. These institutions represent a major segment of American higher education comprising nearly 2.7 million students and 1100 institutions. In a growing number of states the majority of beginning college students are enrolled in these two-year institutions.

A major responsibility is presented because a high degree of provincialism exists among students of two-year colleges. If provincialism is to be replaced by a world view through the educational process, the change must take place while students are in these institutions. Approximately two-thirds of those who enter our public community junior colleges do not continue to a senior college or university.

The need for emphasis on international relations and foreign policy in the curriculums of two-year colleges has intensified with the recent enfranchisement of youth in the 18-20 year age group, who are now placed in a position to influence foreign policy with their votes. We would all hope that they will have the type of background which will enable them to make informed decisions.

By and large community and junior colleges have been so involved with meeting other demands that they have given little attention to educating students for international understanding and responsibility. A major effort is needed to internationalize the curriculums of two-year colleges. It will require revision of the almost exclusive western European orientation which characterizes the social science and humanities which are now offered in these institutions. As revisions are made the emphasis must be on education and not on indoctrination.

Accomplishing these changes will require providing faculty with a background which they do not now possess. And this calls for a shift in federal funding priorities. In the past federal funds for international education have gone almost exclusively to major universities for research and graduate level language training. The priority now needs to be focused on the first two years of undergraduate study in order to insure that the majority of American youth are adequately prepared to wisely exercise their newly attained influence over national policy.

A hopeful sign in this regard is the favorable disposition of the USOE Institute of International Studies toward the two-year college. A recently initiated program of the Institute entitled "New Programs for Strengthening the International Dimension of General Education at the Undergraduate Level", bids well for the future internationalization of two-year colleges.

This Conference serves as a good beginning by sensitizing leaders of our community junior colleges to the importance and changing perspectives of international relations and foreign policy. As a representative of those institutions, I appreciate the effort of the Department of State in arranging this Conference.

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THE NATURE OF THE MODERN WORLD AND SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

ROBERT LEESTMA*

The nations in the modern world are inextricably linked to one another through problems of war and peace and the entire continuum between. Each day the need for achieving a better understanding of the family of man and the human condition becomes increasingly apparent. Over-arching problems and issues like underdevelopment, population growth, and the balance of payments affect the world as a whole. Many other problems are also properly perceived as cross-national in nature or as having implications across national boundaries. This is true whether you are talking of satellite communication, Hong Kong flu, drug addiction, environmental pollution through oil tankers, or sky-jacking.

According to a recent study by the Club of Rome, "the limits to growth on this planet will be reached some time within the next hundred years" if present growth trends of five basic factors continue unchanged. These dominant elements are population growth, accelerating industrialization, depletion of non-renewable resources, a deteriorating environment, and limitations on arable land and fresh water for agricultural production. All five of these variables are interrelated and growing at exponential rates. The dynamic interaction between and among these factors is generating ominous strains upon the earth's finite capacity to sustain life and growth.

These and related facts are such that the members of the Club of Rome and many others who ponder the future can marshal a very persuasive case for the view that many of the major problems facing mankind are of such nature, size and interwoven complexity that traditional institutions, policies, and formulas for dealing with them are no longer adequate to the task.

To get some perspective on the scope and magnitude of recent changes in the world, let us look at a single year, the year just passed, 1971. Here we have the advantage of some unusually perceptive insight in the lead article by Theodore White in the just-published 1972 edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica Book of the Year*. White characterizes 1971 as "the end of the postwar world," the post-World War II world. Look at some of the things that happened in the past year or so and White's assessment of them:

It was a year of watershed events; only 1945 and 1948 could match its panorama of upheavals; history would be decades trying to weigh its impact. China was to be accepted back into the community of nations; proud Great Britain was to be absorbed into the Common Market; Berlin, the swollen pressure head of postwar Europe, was to be lanced...

Gold, 'the magic metal of all time,' had its meaning deflated. South Asia began to undergo the birth of a new nation, Bangladesh.

Yet, when it was over, a story came clear: In 1971 the postwar world came to its end. The settlements of the great wars of the '40's had outlived their times — and were now as obsolete as the Peace of Westphalia.

A giant paradox governed world politics. The postwar world had been one which the United States policed and patrolled against revolution — and, for a decade, it had been steadily losing its power to control events. In 1971 the U.S. recognized this — and, by so doing, paradoxically regained a long-forgotten initiative of action. For years, the U.S. as patron-protector of the 'free world' had subordinated its needs to the needs of those it claimed to protect; in 1971 other nations were forced to adjust their needs to America's recalculation of its needs. For at home, as abroad, the postwar world was over...

Take China alone, which is very much on everybody's mind these days with the resumption of a dialogue between "the world's most populous and ancient civilization" and the world's most industrialized, affluent, and powerful nation. White, an old China hand of great stature, is uniquely equipped to interpret the momentous developments involving China. He reports that in their opening glimpses of China, most journalists and observers began to realize that they were seeing

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...a new China, almost completely in its human emotions, panting from internal exertion – but momentarily held in a balance of tensions...China was even to those most familiar with it, a mysteriously transformed society...it bustled with a purpose imposed on it by the new faith of China.

It was difficult to describe this new faith – for no correspondent, even the oldest and wisest of the visitors, could find the proper words to describe the transformation of people. Yet, collectively, what they reported – if it were to last – amounted to one of the most spectacular conversions of spirit since Christianity, ages ago, had subverted the pagan spirit of Rome and then transformed the state.

China, of course, is far from being all of Asia. The unique importance of Japan, for example – in Asia, in the world, and particularly in relation to the United States – is something that most Americans are only beginning to become aware of, but through automobiles, textiles, and electronics rather than through the school system.

When one turns from individual countries and regions to look closely at general characteristics of the world at large, one begins to discover such facts as that the majority of the world's population is non-white, non-Christian, and certainly non-affluent. If you look at the birth of people or nations, you will find such astonishing statistics as these: more than half of all the people alive today have been born since World War II, and more than half of the nations in existence today have come into being since World War II. It is a new world in more ways than one.

The point of this brief series of observations about the nature of the modern world is simply this: very few of the foregoing facts or trends, very few of these perspectives are an integral part of the education of most American teachers and students at any level. Many of you probably are familiar with Harold Taylor's estimate that only 3-5% of the American teachers now in the classroom have ever engaged in any formal study of non-Western cultures, world affairs, or international relations. Even if the estimate is too low by a factor of three or four, the situation is still terribly serious and clearly needs vast improvement.

However, it is also true that the organizations you already have heard from this morning – the American Association of Colleges for Teacher Education, the Southern Association of Schools and Colleges, the American Association of Junior Colleges – are among those in the very forefront of professional groups that have been seeking to improve this situation in American education. But we must all do better.

We must help each other and our students come to grips with the educational implications of the modern world. Curriculum efforts must become more future oriented to better prepare all students at every educational level for the kind of world in which they are likely to spend the rest of their lives.

If there is any meaning to the concept of "relevancy" in higher education, it must include attention to the increasingly interdependent nature of the world in which we live and to the need for expanding intercultural understanding and for increasing international cooperation on matters of common concern. We need to understand more about the ethnic diversity and cultural pluralism that characterize our world both at home and abroad even as we need to understand more about the fragile, interrelated life support systems of mankind on spaceship earth. All of these facets are reflected in the "riders on the earth together" and "fellow citizens of the world community" concepts in President Nixon's Inaugural Address.

It is clear that the nature of the present and the most probable future world will require a significant improvement in literacy in world affairs on the part of every American citizen. Much of what is relevant to the future of human progress can no longer be dealt with effectively on an ethnocentric basis. The very survival of man as a species will require a higher level of intercultural understanding and of international cooperation than the world has yet achieved.

Thus, the matter of expanding and improving the international/intercultural dimensions of American education is of great and continuing importance. In my judgement, the task is an intrinsic responsibility of everyone in the education profession. The challenge clearly represents one of the educational imperatives of our time, particularly for the 1970's.

Let me say a few words to indicate some of the ways in which selected programs of the Office of Education's Institute of International Studies (IIS) are helping make American higher education more relevant to the world in which we live, with emphasis on developments in the past year or two. First of all, there are two new grant programs in higher education that will be of interest to you. One deals with helping institutions establish or strengthen international dimensions for the general education of all students at the undergraduate level.

To quote from the guidelines for preparing proposals for this program:

This program is aimed at helping institutions better prepare students and prospective teachers for lives and careers in an increasingly interdependent world. It will not only contribute to the acquisition of knowledge and understanding of the many lands and peoples with whom Americans share the planet earth, but is also intended to prepare future citizens and teachers to deal with transnational problems in knowledgeable perspective by increasing their literacy in world affairs.

We are particularly concerned with institutions that train large numbers of teachers, institutions that do their best to have an up-to-date, realistic general education component for those who will later go on to actually teach in elementary and secondary schools. Since this new program is primarily focused on the first two years of higher education, it is also very concerned with general education in the community college portion of the post-secondary education spectrum.

On the graduate level, we are also proud to have launched a new program that can provide assistance to innovative international studies programs which are problem-, issue-, or topic-oriented and that feature a comparative and interdisciplinary approach to transnational matters of common concern. Examples of likely subjects would include comparative urban and environmental studies, East-West relations, and international trade and business. The focus here is principally on the master's level rather than on the doctorate level.

A year ago we started a new category of overseas projects. These are summer programs usually two months in length. We call them Ethnic Heritage Seminars and Workshops Abroad. These special summer programs are aimed primarily at elementary and secondary school teachers and curriculum supervisors who are engaged in conducting or planning ethnic studies programs in American schools. The focus is on the countries of origin from which large numbers of Americans come and the relationship between cultural origins, ethnic heritage, and domestic ethnic studies programs. The first of these new programs abroad will begin next month. There will be one in Japan and one in a Chinese area of Asia. There will also be one in Mexico, two in West Africa, and hopefully a few in Yugoslavia and Poland.

You may also be interested in some recent OE publications from other programs within the Institute of International Studies. One example is the *Dynamics of Inter-Institutional Cooperation in International Education*, a case study of successful experience that will be of assistance to those institutions which seek to capitalize more fully on existing specialized resources and to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort, particularly in high cost areas. The experience analyzed is that of the Regional Council for International Education based in Pittsburgh and made up of 31 different institutions of higher learning in the three states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia. More such effective cooperation among institutions seems to be one of the predictable developments in the future of higher education.

Off the press only a few months ago is a collection of brief case studies of our Foreign Curriculum Consultant Program, entitled *Foreign Curriculum Consultants in Action*. This program is aimed at state departments of education, large city and county school systems, smaller four-year colleges with teacher education programs, and groups of community colleges and of developing institutions. It provides for financing approximately 60% of the cost of bringing an experienced educator from another country to come and work as a foreign area curriculum consultant for a year in your state department, school system, group of post-secondary institutions, or with some combination of these. The booklet consists of 12 case studies presented in human interest terms.

A third publication, just off the press a few days ago, is the latest issue (May) of OE's magazine, *American Education*. The lead article is called "Mao's Educational Revolution" by Dr. Robert Barendsen of IIS, who is the Chinese education specialist in the Office of Education and one of the nation's leading authorities on Chinese education.

Another useful little booklet is entitled *Asian Studies in American Secondary Edu-*

cation. It provides resource material for people concerned with doing a better job at the secondary level. It has particular implications for teacher education programs, both pre-service and in-service.

We also recommend a special issue of *American Education* which was devoted entirely to international education, available upon request to the Institute of International Studies. It contains a number of interesting case studies and feature articles as well as general material. An up-to-date summary of the various Office of Education programs abroad is scheduled for publication in *Exchange* in the fall. *Exchange*, published quarterly, is the official periodical of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs.

Unless otherwise indicated, the foregoing publications are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office. Information on IIS program guidelines and proposal submission details can be obtained upon request to the Institute of the International Studies.

We in the Office of Education believe very strongly that ethnocentric education is obsolete in the modern world. Yet despite the progress made in recent years by so many concerned educators, most American education at all levels remains essentially ethnocentric.

We in OE stand committed, as the other members of this panel stand committed, as most of you are committed, to helping make education more relevant to the times in which we live. Within the various constraints and resource limitations that prevail, we will be pleased to help you however we can in your efforts to modernize American education - to have it reflect adequately the diversity of mankind and the increasingly interdependent nature of the world of the present and the foreseeable future.

THE BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

WILLIAM D. BLAIR, JR.*

The primary role of the Department of State's Bureau of Public Affairs is to promote greater knowledge of and interest in international affairs and U.S. foreign policy, and to improve two-way communication between citizen and government. While the Bureau's responsibility is to the American public as a whole, we are especially interested in maintaining meaningful contact with the academic world for two reasons. The first is simply the resources of information, ideas and intellectual stimulation which the academic community, with its deep and varied international expertise, offers us. The second is our belief, based in part on the findings of leading educators, that the international dimension in the education which we give our young people is still far too thin, given the global reach and interdependence of the community they are citizens of today. To the limited extent possible, we want to encourage and help the teacher to fill this gap.

The list of State Department programs which follows is not intended to be exhaustive, but indicative of our commitment to that objective.

Conferences

The Department regularly organizes or co-sponsors foreign policy conferences in Washington and in major cities throughout the United States. Some are especially directed toward academic groups, and even those which are not, are usually well attended by both teachers and students. We also offer on request foreign affairs presentations for inclusion in conferences arranged by civic, educational or other non-governmental groups.

Scholar-Diplomat Seminars

Young professors visit the Department in groups of 10-15 for a week of briefings, discussions and individual work with Department officers in their field of interest. Under a counterpart program, participating universities sponsor return visits by State Department officers who have acted as Scholar-Diplomat hosts.

Diplomats-in-Residence

Senior Foreign Service officers are assigned for a full academic year to requesting colleges and universities to teach classes, meet with seminars and confer with students and faculty.

Work-Study Program

Highly qualified students have an unusual opportunity to acquire first-hand knowledge of the governmental foreign affairs community by participating for three months in the Department's day-to-day operations or in special projects.

Departmental Briefings

We hold two regularly scheduled morning briefings for the public each week (9:30 a.m. on Tuesdays and Fridays). In addition, visiting groups can make advance arrangements for special briefings.

Campus Visits

In response to invitations from faculty, administration or student groups, our officers visit campuses around the country to speak before convocations and classes and to take part informally in discussions with students and faculty.

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Community Meetings

Groups of three or four officers, each with a different area of expertise, visit several communities during a week-long tour and meet with professional, civic and social groups, teachers and students, and with media representatives.

Telelectures

Telephone lectures by Department officers can be arranged upon request.

Broadcasting

A monthly half-hour radio program, *Students and Diplomats*, produced cooperatively with American University, is available on request and carried by more than 160 radio stations, most of them campus stations.

A weekly five-minute tape-recorded *Report From the Department of State* is being supplied at their request to approximately 20 state and regional educational tape distributors for classroom use, in addition to nearly 1,000 radio stations using these tapes.

Films

More than 90 percent of the 2,000 film prints borrowed from the Department during the past year were requested by teachers. Four films are now being circulated:

From Where I Sit – about the nature and complexity of foreign policy decision-making.

An Age of Revolutions, and *Youth to Maturity* – the first two films in our series on the history of U.S. foreign relations. The third film in the series, *The Reluctant World Power* (covering the World War I-World War II period), will be released this year. We hope to complete a fourth film, bringing the series up to date, by 1974.

Versus – a brief NATO film examining the rationale for NATO and its continuing importance today.

Publications

More than half of the two million-plus copies of publications distributed each year by the Department are in response to requests from students, educators, and libraries. Of particular interest to educators are BACKGROUND NOTES, ISSUES IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (with Discussion Guides for teachers), CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY, and the Department of State BULLETIN.

Historical Research

Our Historical Office assists scholars with research and publishes the Foreign Relations of the United States series, the official diplomatic history. Volumes through 1946 are now available and may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. We are working to reduce the current 25-year publication lag to 20 years over the next three years. Historical records of the Department are currently open through 1945.

External Research

The Office of External Research works to develop and maintain a steady exchange of information and ideas between Government officials, both researchers and policy makers, and private scholars engaged in research on foreign affairs and foreign policy problems.